Confidential — Not for Public Distribution|UC Compliance Use Only · § 8547.10 · Policy 1100171
Bruin Watch
Petition for Independent Audit
and Records Reconciliation
California Whistleblower Protection Act (§§ 8547.2(c), 8547.5, 8547.10, 8547.11)
UC Internal Audit Charter, and Regents Policy 7503
Chapter 03of 11

The Thomas Herz Correspondence

UC’s Own RASC Confirmed Harold’s Disability Classification, 2009–2010

This document was prepared with reasonable care to ensure accuracy of all citations, hyperlinks, and factual references as of its date of submission. Given the complexity of the record — spanning 37 years, multiple UC administrative systems, and over 30 exhibits — unintentional errors in citation format, hyperlink availability, or cross-reference numbering may exist. Any such errors are ministerial in nature and do not affect the substance of the questions presented or the underlying documentary evidence. The author welcomes correction of any inaccuracy identified by the Plan Administrator.

Chapter 03 Table of Contents

I.Participants and Context
II.The Complete Herz Correspondence — September 29, 2009 through June 8, 2010
III.What the Herz Correspondence Establishes
IV.The 2015 Coerced Conversion
V.The Legal Void — Labor Code §§ 5803 and 5804
VI.The Records Disappearance
VII.The Sixth Contradictory Classification
VIII.The Question No One at UC Can Answer
IX.Chapter Exhibits

I. Participants and Context

Between September 29, 2009 and June 8, 2010, Charles A. Harold Jr. exchanged a series of emails with Thomas Herz, a UC Office of the President employee whose departmental title changed three times during the correspondence:

PeriodThomas Herz’s TitlePhone
September 2009Retiree Insurance, University of California, Office of the President510-987-0229
January 2010Health & Welfare Administration, University of California, Office of the President510-987-0229
March 2010 forwardRetiree Administration Service Center, University of California, Office of the President510-987-0229

The 510-987 prefix is the UC Office of the President telephone exchange — the same prefix used by Erin Morse (510-987-0762), the RASC Benefits/Insurance Supervisor who issued the April 9, 2026 acknowledgment letter (CRMCASEID1871390). Herz’s final departmental title — “Retiree Administration Service Center” — is the same RASC that in 2026 issued the Williams-Cook denial and the Morse 90-day review letter.

Additional participants copied on the correspondence:

Bridget Sheehan-Watanabe — Health Care Facilitator, UCLA Benefits Office ([email protected]), CC’d on March 29, 2010 email by Herz.

Silvia Zorzoli — [email protected], CC’d on April 9, 2010 email by Harold.

Harold’s email addresses during the correspondence: [email protected] and [email protected], communicating via BlackBerry from T-Mobile.

Context: Herz was administering UC’s Medicare Secondary Payer compliance program. Under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) — Medicare Secondary Payer provisions), when a retiree on disability becomes eligible for SSDI, they become Medicare-eligible after 24 months of SSDI benefits. UC needed to determine each disability retiree’s SSDI status to properly coordinate benefits. Herz’s task was to obtain Harold’s SSA determination for this purpose.

II. The Complete Herz Correspondence — September 29, 2009 through June 8, 2010

The following is the complete chronological record of every communication between Thomas Herz and Charles A. Harold Jr., reproduced from the original email files. Where multiple copies of the same email exist (forwarded copies, CC copies), the content is presented once with all source files noted.

END OF CORRESPONDENCE

This is the last email in the series. There is no email showing Herz ever received the SSA determination letter, nor any email showing what action UC took based on the outcome. The correspondence ends with Harold reporting he was ineligible for SSDI — which, under Herz’s own stated rationale, meant Harold would NOT become Medicare-eligible through SSDI and would “remain in the non Medicare version of the medical plan.” Yet Harold eventually did transition to Medicare — not through SSDI, but at age 65 (standard eligibility). Herz’s entire 2009–2010 compliance campaign was ultimately moot, but the classification it confirmed — “retiree on disability” / “UCRP disability” — and the coverage structure it described — “the Medicare version of the Anthem Blue Cross plan you are already in” — remain the documented institutional record of what UC’s own RASC believed Harold’s status and entitlement to be.

III. What the Herz Correspondence Establishes

When the 24 emails reproduced above are placed against the full documentary record, the Herz correspondence establishes six independent factual findings. Each finding is drawn exclusively from UC’s own employee’s documented statements.

Finding 1 — Classification Confirmed: In 2009–2010, UC’s own RASC classified Harold as a “retiree on disability” (Email 9, March 29, 2010) and as someone on “UCRP disability” (Email 20, April 9, 2010). This classification does not match any of the five other UC determinations of Harold’s status documented elsewhere in this record: “resigned” (Karl T. Ross, pre-1996), “retired” (CCW cards, 2002 and 2013), “medically separated” (Captain Jeff Chobanian, August 25, 2023), “active retiree” (Chobanian retiree list, August 21, 2023), and “elected regular retirement” (Williams-Cook, February 27, 2026). This constitutes a sixth contradictory UC classification of Harold’s employment status.
Finding 2 — Coverage Entitlement Described: Herz explicitly told Harold that becoming Medicare-eligible would NOT remove him from Anthem — “you transition into the Medicare version of the Anthem Blue Cross plan you are already in” (Email 9). This is the UC High Option Supplement to Medicare — the exact coverage Harold had from 2015 through February 2026, the exact coverage UC attempted to cancel on February 27, 2026, and the exact coverage UC reinstated on April 7, 2026 after regulatory pressure from DMHC and CMS. UC’s own RASC employee described the correct coverage structure sixteen years before UC attempted to strip it.
Finding 3 — Settlement Ignorance: In 2010, a UCOP RASC employee (Herz) stated he was “not aware of any settlements” exempting Harold from general insurance regulations (Email 11) and characterized Harold’s documented workers’ compensation settlement as a “myth” in UC’s “oral tradition” (Email 9). Harold asked twice — March 29, 2010 (Email 10) and April 8, 2010 (Email 16) — for Herz to check with UC’s legal department. There is no record of Herz ever doing so. This is the same RASC that in 2026 issued the Williams-Cook denial without referencing the settlement. The pattern across sixteen years: UC’s benefits administration arm has never, at any documented point, consulted or referenced Harold’s workers’ compensation settlement when making benefits determinations.
Finding 4 — SSA Outcome: SSA determined Harold was ineligible for SSDI because his earnings exceeded the Substantial Gainful Activity threshold (Email 24). Under Herz’s own stated rationale, Harold would NOT become Medicare-eligible through SSDI and would “remain in the non Medicare version of the medical plan” (Email 9). Harold eventually transitioned to Medicare at age 65 (standard eligibility), not through SSDI. Herz’s compliance campaign was ultimately moot — but UC forced Harold through the process while simultaneously failing to maintain, locate, or correctly interpret his own records.
Finding 4A — The Two-Door Problem

UC’s own 1099-R for tax year 2009 — the same year the Herz correspondence began — reports Harold’s distribution as Code 3 (Disability) with $30,059.57 in gross distributions and $2,200.24 taxable (7.3%). Every January, UC mailed Harold a 1099-R — the same tax form every retiree in America receives from their pension. On that form, there is a small box labeled “Distribution Code.” UC filled in Code 3 — the IRS code that means “this person is disabled.” That code told the IRS to treat most of Harold’s income as tax-free, because federal law protects disability income differently than regular retirement income. In January 2010, UC mailed Harold that form for tax year 2009. That same September, Thomas Herz — a UC employee in the same retirement office that prepared the form — was writing Harold emails calling him a “retiree on disability.” The form and the emails said the same thing. UC knew what Harold was. They put it in writing to him and filed it under penalty of perjury with the IRS.

What Herz did next presents UC with a problem that has only two doors, and both lead to the same place.

Door 1: Herz knew Harold’s earnings. He worked in the same RASC office that prepared the 1099-R showing $30,059.57 in gross distributions for 2009. That is over $30,000 a year — well above the SSDI Substantial Gainful Activity threshold of $12,000 per year ($1,000 per month). If Herz knew what Harold earned, then he knew Harold could never qualify for SSDI, which means the entire compliance campaign — the nine months of emails, the threats, the May deadline, the demand that Harold physically go to a Social Security office — was pointless from day one. Herz was sending Harold on a fool’s errand. The question becomes: why?

Door 2: Herz did not know Harold’s earnings. He did not have access to the file. He did not know about the workers’ compensation settlement. He called the settlement a “myth.” He did not know Harold’s classification history. If this is the case, then UC’s records were already so broken in 2009 that a RASC employee administering disability retiree compliance did not know what his own office was paying Harold or how it was classified. Karl T. Ross said Harold resigned. Ida Fong, eleven years later, could not find Harold’s disability records. The 1099-R said Code 3 — Disability. Herz said “retiree on disability.” No one was looking at the same file because there was no single file.

Both doors lead to the same place. Either UC’s RASC knowingly pushed a disabled retiree through a process he could never qualify for — or UC’s record-keeping was so fragmented that the office administering disability compliance did not know its own retiree’s classification and earnings. Either way, the institution failed. Either way, the direction of the push was the same: toward SSDI, toward Medicare eligibility, toward shifting Harold off UC’s books.

This is the Schrödinger’s Retiree problem reduced to its simplest form. Harold’s status changes depending on which UC employee opens the box. Herz opens the box and sees “retiree on disability.” Karl T. Ross opens the box and sees “resigned.” Williams-Cook opens the box and sees “elected regular retirement.” Captain Chobanian opens the box and sees “medically separated.” The 1099-R opens the box and sees Code 3 — Disability. They cannot all be right.

This is the Schrödinger’s Retiree problem reduced to its simplest form. Harold’s status changes depending on which UC employee opens the box. Herz opens the box and sees “retiree on disability.” Karl T. Ross opens the box and sees “resigned.” Williams-Cook opens the box and sees “elected regular retirement.” Captain Chobanian opens the box and sees “medically separated.” The 1099-R opens the box and sees Code 3 — Disability. They cannot all be right.

But every single one of them produces the outcome least favorable to Harold at the moment it is applied.

◆ Foreshadow — Chapter 12

The reader will encounter this pattern again. In Chapter 12, the Department of Justice alleges that Elevance Health — the parent company of Anthem Blue Cross, Harold’s insurer throughout this entire period — paid brokers $262 million to steer Medicare beneficiaries away from coverage that was expensive for the insurer and into programs that shifted costs to Medicare. The Shea complaint alleges that Elevance Health’s broker network used different tools — kickbacks, call routing, agent coaching — but always in the same direction: push disabled beneficiaries away from coverage that is expensive for the insurer. UC used different tools — compliance threats, coerced conversion, a Via Benefits transfer — but always in the same direction: push Harold away from coverage that is expensive for UC and its insurer, Anthem Blue Cross, an Elevance Health subsidiary.

Harold had Anthem Blue Cross coverage the entire time. Every institutional push moved in the direction that would benefit both UC and Anthem. The documented record speaks for itself.
Finding 5 — Compliance Threat Pattern: Herz threatened Harold with “termination of UC medical coverage” and an “offset fee” (Email 15) for failure to provide SSA documentation. In 2026, Williams-Cook terminated Harold’s UC medical coverage based on a determination citing “our records indicate.” The pattern across sixteen years: UC repeatedly threatens or executes termination of Harold’s medical coverage while simultaneously failing to maintain, locate, or correctly interpret Harold’s own records. The institution demands compliance from the retiree while being unable to achieve compliance within its own record-keeping systems.
Finding 6 — Failure to Investigate Settlement Terms: Harold explicitly asked Herz — twice, in writing — to verify his settlement agreement before taking any action regarding his insurance (Emails 10 and 16). Herz did not do so. Instead, Herz applied general policy, dismissed Harold’s settlement as a “myth,” and assured Harold that SSA compliance would not jeopardize his settlement — without having read the settlement. When a plan administrator applies general policy to a beneficiary who has explicitly invoked a specific legal agreement governing their benefits, and the administrator refuses to verify that agreement, that constitutes a failure of the fiduciary obligation to administer benefits in accordance with the governing documents under California Government Code § 53213.5 (governmental plan fiduciary standards).

IV. The 2015 Coerced Conversion

Five years after Herz confirmed Harold’s disability classification in 2010, the documented record shows the following sequence:

In or around 2015, Harold received a call from a female UC representative who stated he must convert his classification from Duty Disability Income to Retirement Income or he would stop receiving any income. This individual claimed she knew nothing about Harold’s workers’ compensation settlement or lawsuit. Harold was told he had two options: submit to a medical examination for a condition already determined to be permanent and stationary (Octagon Risk Services, August 8, 2001), or convert to regular service retirement. Harold complied under that threat.

This is reflected in Williams-Cook’s February 27, 2026 determination, which states: “You elected regular retirement in June 2015.”

The word “elected” requires examination against UC’s own 1099-R data.

THE MATH FROM UC’s OWN IRS FORM 1099-R FILINGS:

2014 (last full disability year — Distribution Code 3):
Gross Distribution: $33,188.26
Taxable Amount: $2,429.25
Tax-free portion: $30,758.01
Approximately 92.7% of Harold’s pension income was tax-exempt under the disability classification.

2016 (first full “regular retirement” year — Distribution Code 2):
Gross Distribution: $27,767.01
Taxable Amount: $27,767.01
Tax-free portion: $0.00
100% of Harold’s pension income became taxable. Gross distribution dropped by $5,421.25 per year.

Additionally: Harold became obligated to pay $727.48 per month ($8,729.76 annually) in insurance premiums for coverage that was previously provided under the workers’ compensation settlement (“UC will continue to pay all medical bills” — Octagon letter, August 8, 2001).

Lost IRC § 402(l) exclusion: Up to $3,000 per year in additional tax benefit Harold could not claim because UC never reported premium deductions on the 1099-R.

TOTAL ANNUAL COST OF THE “ELECTION”: Conservatively $20,000+ per year in combined lost tax benefits, reduced pension, and new premium obligations. Over ten years (2015–2025): approximately $200,000+ in cumulative financial harm from the “election.”

From Harold’s perspective at the moment of the 2015 phone call, the choice presented was not “tax-free disability income vs. taxable retirement income.” The choice presented was: switch or lose EVERYTHING. Under that framing — a UC employee telling Harold all coverage will be terminated if he does not comply — taking a financial hit was the rational choice because the alternative presented was total loss. Harold did not make an irrational financial decision. Harold made the only decision available to him under the threat as stated. The “election” was rational ONLY because UC manufactured the duress. Remove the threat, and no rational person makes that deal.

The pattern is identical to the Herz correspondence five years earlier: a UC employee who has no knowledge of Harold’s workers’ compensation settlement applies general policy to Harold’s case, threatens termination if he does not comply, and does not investigate the specific legal agreement governing his benefits.

◆ The Playbook — 2009 and 2015

The documented record now contains two separate instances — five years apart, involving two different UC employees — of the same institutional play: contact Harold, claim no knowledge of his settlement, apply general policy, threaten loss of benefits, push him toward a reclassification that shifts costs away from UC. The first attempt (Herz, 2009) failed because Harold was ineligible for SSDI. The second attempt (2015) succeeded because the threat was more direct: convert or lose everything. Both attempts bypassed the WCAB. Neither employee consulted Harold’s settlement file.

The 2015 conversion occurred one year before the Department of Justice’s documented kickback scheme began (2016–2021). The Herz correspondence extends the same behavioral pattern back to 2009 — seven years before the DOJ’s timeline. Harold’s insurer throughout both periods was Anthem Blue Cross, an Elevance Health subsidiary — the defendant in United States ex rel. Shea v. eHealth, Inc., et al.

This pattern did not exist in hindsight. It created itself in real time — contemporaneous documents, generated by UC’s own employees, in UC’s own emails, on UC’s own 1099-R filings — across a decade of institutional conduct that Harold had no reason to anticipate and no ability to fabricate.

The question for the Plan Administrator: Why would any rational person voluntarily relinquish tax-free disability income and employer-paid medical insurance in exchange for fully taxable income, a reduced pension, and $727.48 per month in insurance premiums? Please identify what financial or coverage benefit Harold received from this “election” that would explain why a reasonable person would voluntarily make it.

Under California Labor Code § 5803, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) retains continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation awards. Under Labor Code § 5803, the WCAB has exclusive authority to “rescind, alter, or amend any order, decision, or award” relating to disability, and this requires notice and opportunity to be heard.

Harold’s disability classification and lifetime medical coverage were established by the 2003 workers’ compensation settlement (Claim No. 199650445, attorney Dennis Hargrove). That settlement is a WCAB-approved disposition. The Octagon permanent disability determination of August 8, 2001 has never been revoked.

For Harold’s disability classification to be legally changed — for him to move from disability status to regular retirement status — a WCAB proceeding was required. Not a phone call from a UC benefits employee. Not a form. Not an “election.” A formal WCAB proceeding with notice and opportunity to be heard, resulting in a modification order.

No such proceeding ever occurred. No WCAB modification order exists on the record.

(A) Harold could not legally “elect” to change his own disability classification. A workers’ compensation beneficiary cannot unilaterally waive or modify a WCAB-approved settlement by signing an enrollment form or agreeing on a phone call. The WCAB’s jurisdiction is exclusive under § 5803. Harold’s “election” had no legal effect on his disability status because he lacked the legal authority to make it.
(B) UC could not legally change Harold’s disability classification by phone call or administrative action. UC is a party to the workers’ compensation settlement. For UC to change Harold’s status from disability to regular retirement, UC was required to petition the WCAB for a modification under § 5804. UC did not do so. There is no WCAB modification order in the record.
(C) Both parties acted outside the WCAB’s exclusive jurisdiction. Harold “agreed” to something he had no legal authority to agree to. UC “processed” a change it had no legal authority to process. The 2015 “election” is void as a matter of law because it was effectuated outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the WCAB.
(D) UC encouraged and facilitated the unauthorized modification. The UC employee who called Harold in 2015 did not advise Harold that a WCAB proceeding was required. The UC employee did not consult Harold’s settlement file (because she claimed not to know about it). UC processed the classification change administratively without petitioning the WCAB. Under § 5803, only the WCAB can rescind, alter, or amend an order relating to disability. UC bypassed that requirement entirely.

This connects directly to the Herz correspondence: Herz in 2010 was already treating Harold’s disability classification as subject to general UC administrative policy — telling Harold he had to comply with SSA documentation requirements “as it does to all other retirees on disability,” and threatening termination of coverage for non-compliance. Herz never mentioned the WCAB. Herz never referenced the settlement. Herz applied administrative compliance rules to a workers’ compensation beneficiary whose status could only be modified by the WCAB. Then in 2015, a different UC employee did the same thing — applied administrative process (a phone call and an enrollment form) to accomplish a classification change that legally required a WCAB proceeding.

The pattern across 2010 and 2015: UC has repeatedly treated Harold’s workers’ compensation settlement as if it were a standard administrative enrollment decision subject to UC’s internal policies, when in fact it is a WCAB-approved legal disposition subject to the WCAB’s exclusive continuing jurisdiction under Labor Code §§ 5803 and 5804.

The question for the Plan Administrator: Please produce the WCAB modification order authorizing the change in Harold’s classification from disability to regular retirement in June 2015. If no such order exists, please state for the record by what legal authority UC changed a classification established by a WCAB-approved workers’ compensation settlement.

VI. The Records Disappearance

The Herz correspondence is the last clean snapshot of what UC actually knew about Harold’s classification before the records chaos began. The following timeline documents what happened after Herz’s 2010 confirmation:

2009–2010: Thomas Herz, UCOP RASC, classifies Harold as a “retiree on disability” and “UCRP disability.” Account number: AS 0010747. Stable.

2010–2014: UC’s IRS Form 1099-R filings use Distribution Code 3 (Disability). Account number remains AS 0010747. Stable.

2015: Female UC representative calls Harold, claims no knowledge of his settlement, tells him he must convert or lose everything. Harold complies under duress. UC issues TWO corrected 1099-R forms — the only year with multiple corrected forms. Distribution Code changes from 3 to 2. Account number remains AS 0010747.

2016–2019: Distribution Code now 2 (Early Distribution). 100% of pension income taxable. Harold paying $727.48/month in premiums. Account number still AS 0010747 — stable for a full decade (2010–2019).

2020: FIRST account number change in a decade. UC assigns TWO sequential new numbers (AS 0011041 and AS 0011042) to the same pension in the same tax year. One gets Code 2, the other gets Code 7. December 24, 2020: Accellion data breach — 547,000+ individuals. Disability accommodation data exposed.

2021: Another new account number: AS 0011451. RASC analyst Ida Fong discovers Harold’s son Max erroneously coded as “disabled” in UC’s system. Max has never been disabled. Fong admits records were “lost during computer system upgrades.” She cannot find Harold’s disability records. Seven separate Anthem data breaches documented this year.

2022: Another new account number: AS 0011572.

2023: Another new account number: AS 0011958. Captain Jeff Chobanian accesses Harold’s personnel file, classifies him as “medically separated,” denies CCW.

2024: Another new account number: AS 0012183.

2025: Another new account number: AS 0012451.

February 17, 2026: UCLA CFO Stephen Agostini publicly confirms erroneous financial records since 2002. Agostini is fired the same day.

February 27, 2026: Williams-Cook issues determination based on “our records indicate” — without identifying which records, from which system, reviewed by whom, or referencing the settlement.

Seven account number changes in six years after a decade of stability. Account numbers in a pension system do not change by themselves. Each change means someone or something accessed and modified Harold’s record. The fact that the changes cluster starting in 2020 (data breach year) and continue annually through 2025 is a factual correlation. Whether the changes were caused by breach remediation, system migrations, manual record modifications, or something else — UC has the logs and UC can answer that question. That is an audit question.

The question for the Plan Administrator: What happened to Harold’s records between Herz’s 2010 confirmation of disability status and Williams-Cook’s 2026 denial of disability status? UC’s own RASC confirmed the classification. Then the records disappeared. Then UC issued a determination contradicting the classification its own office had confirmed. Under California Evidence Code § 413, the failure to produce records within a party’s control permits the inference that those records would be adverse to the party that failed to produce them. Under Cal. Code Regs. Title 8, § 15400.2, claim files where future benefits may be payable “shall not” be destroyed.

VII. The Sixth Contradictory Classification

Herz’s “retiree on disability” classification adds a sixth contradictory UC determination of Harold’s employment status to the five already documented in this record:

#ClassificationSourceDate
1“Resigned”Karl T. Ross (named defendant, SC022125)Pre-1996
2Permanent disability recipient — “UC will continue to pay all medical bills”Octagon Risk Services, Workers’ Comp Claim No. 199650445August 8, 2001
3“RETIRED”CCW permits issued by Chief Chapman (2002) and UCLA PD (2013)2002, 2013
4“Retiree on disability” / “UCRP disability”Thomas Herz, UCOP RASC (Emails 9 and 20)2009–2010
5“Medically separated” / “Active retiree”Captain Jeff Chobanian, Badge #307, UCLA PDAugust 2023
6“Elected regular retirement” / “Not receiving UCRP Disability Income”Jeanine Williams-Cook, Benefits Analyst III, RASCFebruary 27, 2026

Six different UC determinations. Six different classifications. One employee. Twenty-five years. Each determination was made by a UC employee or UC-contracted entity acting within their institutional authority. No two determinations agree on what Harold is.

Herz’s classification (Row 4) is of particular significance because it came from inside RASC itself — the same office that in 2026 issued the Williams-Cook determination (Row 6) stating Harold was NOT a disability retiree. UC’s own RASC classified Harold as a “retiree on disability” in 2010. UC’s own RASC classified Harold as having “elected regular retirement” in 2026. The same office. Opposite conclusions. Sixteen years apart. No WCAB modification order between them.

VIII. The Question No One at UC Can Answer

The Herz correspondence, when combined with the 2015 coerced conversion, the 1099-R data, the records disappearance, and the six contradictory classifications, produces two questions that the Plan Administrator must answer:

Herz Finding 1 — The Arithmetic Question:
UC’s records state that Harold “elected regular retirement in June 2015.” Under Harold’s disability classification (Distribution Code 3), approximately 92.7% of his pension income was tax-exempt, and his medical coverage was provided under the workers’ compensation settlement at no premium cost to Harold. Under the regular retirement classification (Distribution Code 2/7), 100% of his pension income became taxable, his gross distribution decreased by $5,421.25 per year, and he became obligated to pay $727.48 per month in insurance premiums. Please identify what financial or coverage benefit Harold received from this “election” that would explain why a reasonable person would voluntarily make it.

Herz Finding 2 — The Legal Authority Question:
Please produce the WCAB modification order authorizing the change in Harold’s classification from disability to regular retirement in June 2015, as required under Labor Code § 5803 and § 5804. If no such order exists, please state for the record by what legal authority UC changed a classification established by a WCAB-approved workers’ compensation settlement (Claim No. 199650445, 2003, attorney Dennis Hargrove) and confirmed by UC’s own RASC employee (Thomas Herz, 2009–2010).

IX. Chapter Exhibits

The following exhibits are referenced in this chapter. Exhibit numbers are sequential within this chapter. Source filenames correspond to the original email files as preserved by Harold.

Ex.Document DescriptionDate
EX 01Herz to Harold — Initial SSA determination request; Harold reply asking for UC disability rating documentationSept. 29, 2009
EX 02Herz to Harold — “documents for compliance” confirmation; title change to Health & Welfare AdministrationJan. 22, 2010
EX 03Harold to Herz — SSA system access problems; asks why UC needs this documentMar. 8, 2010
EX 04  |  EX 04bComplete March 28–29, 2010 thread — Harold invokes settlement; Herz classifies Harold as “retiree on disability,” calls settlement a “myth,” describes Anthem Medicare supplement coverage; Harold asks Herz to verify settlement with legal (first request)Mar. 28–29, 2010
EX 05Herz to Harold (CC: Sheehan-Watanabe) — “not aware of any settlements,” refuses to check with legal, assures Harold settlement is not jeopardized without having read itMar. 29, 2010
EX 06  |  EX 06bHarold self-forwarded email chain — records preservationMar. 29, 2010
EX 07Herz to Harold — Escalation: threatens “offset fee” and “termination of UC medical coverage”; sets May deadlineApr. 6, 2010
EX 08  |  EX 08bApril 9, 2010 thread — Harold’s second request to check with legal (ignored by Herz); Herz classifies Harold as “UCRP disability”; Harold reports SSA online system blocked himApr. 8–9, 2010
EX 09  |  EX 09bFinal emails — Herz follow-up on SSA letter; Harold reports SSA determination of ineligibility (earned over $12K/year)June 8, 2010

Documents referenced herein that were created by UC, issued by UC, filed by UC, retained by UC, or filed with the IRS under penalty of perjury, or generated by UC’s own contracted insurer, are UC’s own institutional record. Documents created by the undersigned were created in direct response to UC’s own records and communications. Where UC’s own institutional records are not produced to clarify this audit, the author will rely on California Evidence Code § 413, under which the failure to produce evidence within a party’s control permits the inference that such evidence would be adverse to the party withholding it.

Submitted for Regulatory Review and Public Accountability

Charles A. Harold Jr. Signature

Charles A. Harold Jr.
UCLA Police Department (Retired?), Badge #341
Founder and First President, Federated University Police Officers’ Association (FUPOA)

I affirm that the information contained in this document and its exhibits is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and good faith belief, submitted under the protections of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (False Claims Act anti-retaliation) and California Labor Code § 1102.5.

Petition for Independent Audit — The Bruin Watch Series

Act I · Law Enforcement Without Enforcement

Act II · Schrödinger’s Retiree

Act III · The UC Audit Request

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