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EVIDENTIARY PACKAGE — CHAPTERS FILED AND PENDING

CH	TITLE	STATUS
00	Introduction & Navigation Roadmap	Filed Feb. 10, 2026
01	The Unqualified Benefits Transfer	Filed Feb. 10, 2026
02	The Right to Rescind the Via Benefits Enrollment	Filed Feb. 10, 2026
03	Four UC Systems Can't Agree on Coverage	Filed Feb. 10, 2026
04	Six Recorded Calls Capture UC Agents Admitting Coverage Failures on Tape	Filed Feb. 11, 2026
05	25 Data Breaches Exposed the Systems That Were Supposed to Protect Harold's Records	Filed Feb. 11, 2026
06	10 Contradictions UC Cannot Reconcile	Filed Feb. 11, 2026
07	UC's Own Tax Filings Expose the Switch from Disability	Pending
08	The Laws UC Violated: Constructive Notice, Breach of Contract & Whistleblower Retaliation	Filed Feb. 19, 2026
09	The Invalid Election: How UC's Own Federal Tax Filings Prove the 2015 Conversion Was Coerced	Pending
10	Master Evidence Index and Court Records	Pending
11	Who Is Watching — Regulatory Oversight Matrix	Pending
12	The Case Against Competence	Filed Feb. 19, 2026
13	The CCW Evidence Compendium	Pending
14	Demand to Stop Medical Coverage Transfers	Pending
15	The Civil Rights Case	Pending

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1. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This memorandum is submitted in support of the Third Formal Request for and Audit and Reconciliation of Permanent Disability Determination and Current Retiree Medical Premium Deductions, dated January 31, 2026, addressed to the UC Retirement Administration Service Center (RASC). The first formal request was submitted on November 9, 2021, by attorney Edgar Saenz, Esq., addressed to Alexander Bustamante, Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance & Audit Officer, University of California. That request was sent by both certified mail and email (Gmail delivery confirmed November 9, 2021, 3:10 PM). That request has remained unanswered for over four years.

MEDICAL URGENCY: Harold is scheduled for cancer surgery on February 25, 2026. Any change to current insurance status, OR FUTURE STATUS, authorizations, or coverage terms could jeopardize the scheduled surgery date, continuity and quality of care, and Harold's recovery, health and life expectancy.

This memorandum presents six discrete legal issues, each analyzed under the IRAC method (Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion). The purpose is to present documented facts and applicable legal authorities so that the reader may form their own conclusions. Harold does not make accusations. Harold presents facts, documents, and the application of law, statute, regulation, and UC policy to those facts.

Every factual assertion in this memorandum is supported by documentary evidence in Harold's possession, including original correspondence, tax documents (IRS Forms 1099-R, 2010–2024), official UC records, CCW permits, the Octagon Risk Services permanent disability determination letter, published UCLA institutional research, and contemporaneous email correspondence with UC officials.

Cross-Reference: This chapter provides the legal framework for the facts documented in Chapter 01: The Unqualified Benefits Transfer, Chapter 02: The Right to Rescind the Via Benefits Enrollment, and Chapter 03: Four UC Systems Can't Agree on Coverage. The rescission grounds established in Chapter 02 under California Civil Code §§ 1689 and 1691 are supported by the breach of contract and promissory estoppel analysis in Issue III of this chapter. The ERISA § 510 interference claims cited in Chapter 01 are further developed in Issue II. The recorded institutional admissions documented in Chapter 04: Six Recorded Calls Capture UC Agents Admitting Coverage Failures on Tape provide the factual basis for several of the applications below.

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2. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

A. Employment and Whistleblowing (1989–1996)

1. Charles A. Harold Jr. was employed as a sworn peace officer by the UCLA Police Department beginning in December 1989. Prior to UCLA, Harold served as a sworn peace officer with the San Gabriel Police Department (1983–1985) and the Culver City Police Department (1985–1988), after graduating from the Rio Hondo Police Academy in 1983.

2. Harold was elected founding president of the Federated University Police Officers' Association (FUPOA), the first labor organization representing UC police officers.

3. Beginning in approximately 1992, Harold engaged in highly documented and publicized whistleblowing activities. He discovered: missing police vehicles that the Chief had sold for cash to the Tijuana Police Department and to movie studios; police vehicle records missing VIN numbers and license plates; the Chief's sale of tires from a drug asset seizure vehicle to a UCLA police officer who later became a UCPD police captain (a violation of federal law); officers being paid who no longer worked at the department and systemic racism from the chief of police and some of his command staff.

4. As a direct result of these whistleblowing activities and his role as police association president, Harold was subjected to documented and verified retaliation including: (a) false disciplinary write-ups (all of which were thrown out upon review); (b) a bullet placed in his mailbox with his name written on it; (c) cancellation of his scheduled days off to prevent him from completing his first year of law school; (d) beeper messages of 187, the California Penal Code for homicide; (e) a shooting at his home in Northridge, California (reported to local police; Northridge is a residential neighborhood approximately one block from California State University, Northridge, in the vicinity of the Northridge Meadows apartments and the 1994 Northridge earthquake epicenter — not a location associated with random gun violence); (f) false remarks made about him by a department lieutenant stating he used cocaine to other officers from several different departments, among them his former employer Culver City; (g) interference with his attempts to seek employment with another police department; and (g) verified and sustained sexual harassment by a superior officer, the same police lieutenant that stated Harold used cocaine. (No drug test was ever requested or demanded by UCLA PD).

5. Harold and several other officers filed a state tort action (Harold v. The Regents of the University of California) for discrimination, whistleblowing, acts against public policy, sexual harassment, and corruption. UC moved to dismiss, arguing that Harold, as a white person and not a member of a protected class, had no standing to sue for racial discrimination. The court disagreed, holding that Harold had a right to speak out on behalf of protected classes because protected classes may feel intimidated to do so. The case proceeded. Coverage appeared in the Los Angeles Times on February 25, 1993, and April 24, 1994.

6. Harold filed a federal lawsuit (University Police Officers v. Regents, Case No. 2:96-cv-00396-WDK-AJW, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, filed January 19, 1996) to recover over $1 million in compensatory overtime that the Chief refused to pay officers in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Harold and the officers prevailed.

7. As a result of Harold's whistleblowing and investigations, UC investigated and terminated the Chief of Police and several members of his command staff. UC subsequently hired a new chief, Chapman, who continued investigating Harold while he was on paid administrative leave. This culminated in a final investigation against Harold where he was called in to be terminated for alleged improper actions off duty. Harold proved that the police investigator lied during the investigation and falsified official records. As a result, the police lieutenant who conducted the investigation was terminated, and Chief Chapman reinstated Harold to full active-duty status.

8. Harold returned to active patrol duty in approximately 1995.

B. On-Duty Injury, Financial Devastation, and Settlement (1996–2003)

9. On February 16, 1996, Harold was injured in an altercation while in uniform, on full active duty, during a radio call dispatched by UCPD. He was transported by ambulance to the Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center, where a physician diagnosed a torn meniscus in his knee, back injuries, and other injuries. The UCLA physician placed Harold on medical leave and informed him he could not return to work until further evaluation.

10. One month after this documented on-duty injury — an injury that occurred during a dispatched radio call, responded to in uniform, resulting in ambulance transport to UCLA Medical Center — the UCLA Police Department stopped paying Harold his monthly salary. The Chief stated Harold would not receive a paycheck because it was not clear the injury occurred "on-duty." Harold filed a workers' compensation case.

11. During this period of unpaid medical leave, Harold's family suffered severe financial hardship. Harold was forced to file bankruptcy. Harold's wife suffered a miscarriage of their third child during this period of financial and emotional crisis, not long after the shooting at their Northridge home. The bankruptcy court seized the pending state tort action (Harold v. Regents) as an asset. UC settled with the bankruptcy court for approximately $50,000 to pay Harold's creditors. Harold received no money personally from the state tort action and Harold never signed a settlement agreement in that case, leaving the case technically open for future claims of harassment.

12. In March 1996, Harold began working for the Fox Broadcasting Company. Between March 1996 and August 2001, he received no regular pay from UCLA, no workers' compensation or disability benefits, yet UCLA continued to carry him on their books as being employed on leave.

13. On August 8, 2001, Octagon Risk Services, acting as claims administrator for UC Los Angeles, issued a written notice titled "NOTICE REGARDING START & END OF PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS." This notice established that Harold's industrial injury from 1996 was determined to be permanent and stationary, resulting in a permanent disability rating, with permanent disability benefits calculated at $3,075.98 per month tax-free.

14. Harold's workers' compensation case settled in March 2003. The documented terms of the settlement were: (a) paid health insurance for Harold and his family for life; (b) disability retirement status; (c) a lump sum payment of $10,000; and (d) a concealed weapons permit from the police department. (See Chapter 01: The Unqualified Benefits Transfer, documenting the full chronology of the settlement and its subsequent modification.)

C. Settlement Performance Period (2003–2014)

15. Following the March 2003 settlement, UC performed under the settlement terms for over a decade. UC paid Harold a tax-free "Disability Income" of approximately $3,000 per month. Health insurance was paid by UC and was not deducted from Harold's monthly disability payments. Harold received his concealed weapons permit. Harold's IRS Form 1099-R for tax years 2010 through 2014 reflected tax-free payments consistent with disability income classification. (See Chapter 07: UC's Own Tax Filings Expose the Switch — $149K in Harm, documenting the year-by-year tax code transition.)

16. During this period, UCPD issued and renewed Harold's CCW permit. A CCW permit issued on August 29, 2002, and reissued on August 29, 2013, with expiration date of August 29, 2018, explicitly identifies Harold as a "retired officer" of the "University of California Police Department," and states the permit is "Issued pursuant to CPC sections 25455, 25460 & 25465." The permit bears the Chief of Police's signature.

D. Unilateral Modification of Settlement Terms (2009–2015)

17. Beginning in approximately 2009, UC employee Thomas Herz of the UC Office of the President, Retirement Administration Service Center (using varying departmental titles including "Retiree Administration Service Center," "Health & Welfare Administration," and the UC Office of the President phone line), initiated correspondence pressuring Harold to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). (Thomas Herz emails: March 8, 2010; March 29, 2010; April 6, 2010; April 9, 2010; June 8, 2010.)

18. On March 29, 2010, when Harold informed Thomas Herz that his settlement included lifetime medical coverage, Herz responded in writing: "Lifetime medical is not a vested benefit for any UC retiree although we have provided this benefit for decades. It has moved into the realm of myths in the oral tradition since there is nothing in writing in our guidelines that promises this in perpetuity." Herz did not check with UC legal counsel about Harold's specific settlement, despite Harold's express written request: "I would like you to check with your legal department about my settlement before you decide on any action regarding my insurance. I think you will find it was a unique case." It is important to note that Herz referred to Harold as a “retiree” when in fact he was not retired, he was on settled disability status.

19. In the same correspondence chain, Herz stated: "I am not aware of any settlements that UC has made that specifically exempts one individual from the general insurance regulations that govern this process and I doubt that legal counsel would have established this kind of precedent in your case." Herz made this statement without first consulting UC legal counsel about Harold's settlement, despite Harold's request that he do so.

20. In the same correspondence chain, Herz acknowledged that "a number of UC people on UCRP disability have applied for SSDI and some have been awarded them despite being considerably younger than 61," confirming that UC maintained an established SSDI application pipeline for other disability recipients while simultaneously pressuring Harold to enter the same pipeline. The very case Captain Chobanian later cited to deny Harold's CCW — Jacobs et al. v. The Regents of the University of California (2017) 2d Dist., Case No. B268758, at p. 10 — holds that Disabled Members receiving DDI 'can elect to retire when eligible, but are never required to do so.' The Regents' own lead disability benefits analyst stated under oath in the same proceeding that '[a] person may convert to Retirement only by making an affirmative election to do so.

21. Sometime after 2014, Harold began receiving letters from a third-party workers' compensation adjusting company representing UC (believed to be Gates or Gallagher). A representative stated Harold was required to appear for a medical examination for fitness for duty to determine if he still qualified for "Disability Income." Harold explained that his settlement had no such requirement. The representative stated she "knew nothing about a lawsuit or worker's comp settlement agreement." She stated Harold was required to appear for a medical examination or UC would stop his monthly disability payments.

22. In early 2015, Harold contacted UC "At Your Service." At Your Service had no records reflecting Harold's workers' compensation case or settlement agreement. At Your Service explained that Harold's 21 years of service credit had been reached by combining his active-duty time with his disability time, making him eligible for "Service Retirement Income." When Harold specifically asked about his medical insurance, he was told that UC would continue to pay for his medical insurance because they had been paying for it under disability income previously. (See Chapter 03: Four UC Systems Can't Agree on Coverage, documenting the contradictory coverage information from UC's own systems.)

23. Harold's IRS Form 1099-R beginning in tax year 2016 forward reflected fully taxable retirement income (Distribution Code 7), a fundamental change from the tax-free disability income classification (Distribution Code 2 or 3) of prior years. UC began deducting health insurance premiums from Harold's monthly payments. These premium deductions over the period from approximately 2015 through the present total approximately $133,000 to $150,000. (See Chapter 07: UC's Own Tax Filings Expose the Switch — $149K in Harm, providing the complete year-by-year tax analysis including federal tax overpayment of $56,398, California state tax overpayment of $23,848, and Arizona state tax overpayment of $6,936.)

E. Post-Conversion Reports to UC Entities (2021–2026)

24. On February 24, 2021, Ida Fong of UC Benefits called Harold regarding his son Max's health insurance coverage. UC's system had Max incorrectly coded as "disabled." Harold's son Max has never been disabled. Harold explained to Ida Fong that Max had never been disabled; however, Harold himself had a disability rating and "Disability Income" from the UCLA Police Department before it was converted to "Retirement Income."

25. On March 18, 2021, Ida Fong called Harold again. She stated that when UC upgraded their computer systems several years ago, old records were lost and not recovered, so she could not look up any information about Harold's original workers' compensation case and disability status. Ms. Fong stated she had no computer records about Harold's status because when UC installed a new computer system years ago, all records from the old system were lost.

26. On November 9, 2021, attorney Edgar Saenz, Esq. submitted a formal written Request for Audit of Charles A. Harold, Jr. files to Alexander Bustamante, Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance & Audit Officer, University of California. The letter was sent by both certified mail and email to [email protected] (Gmail delivery confirmed November 9, 2021, 3:10 PM). The letter detailed Harold's whistleblowing history, on-duty injury, workers' compensation settlement terms, and the 2015 conversion from disability to retirement income. The letter requested that UC reverse the erroneous change and undertake an audit of Harold's personnel and disability status records. This formal audit request has remained unanswered for over four years. (See Chapter 09: Second Formal Demand After Four Years of Silence — Produce the Records or Explain Their Absence.)

27. On August 21–25, 2023, Harold corresponded with Lt. Jeff Chobanian of UCPD regarding CCW renewal. Harold identified himself as "THAT Chuck Harold," provided his service history and POST certification, and cited the 1994 Los Angeles Times article about his lawsuit. On August 25, 2023, Lt. Chobanian responded that Harold's "status was designated as medically separated on March 1, 1996" and that Harold was therefore ineligible for a CCW under a "UCOP mandate." Lt. Chobanian attached UCLA PD Policy 209, the UC Gold Book Policy (dated August 18, 2020), and the appellate decision in Jacobs v. The Regents of the University of California.

28. On January 31, 2026, Harold submitted the Second Formal Request for Reconciliation to UC RASC, documenting the above facts and requesting written reconciliation of his permanent disability status with his current retiree medical premium deductions.

F. UCLA Institutional Documentation of Harold's Case

29. In March 2022, the UCLA Luskin Center for History and Policy published "The History of Racism and the Quest for Racial Justice at UCLA," a comprehensive institutional research report. The research was conducted over an eighteen-month period from June 2020 through March 2022, by a team of over a dozen graduate and undergraduate student researchers, supervised by UCLA Professors Aomar Boum, Eddie Cole, and David N. Myers. On pages 35–36, the report specifically names Charles A. Harold, documents his lawsuits against UCPD and the Regents, quotes his charges of excessive force and institutional violence, and quotes the UCLA Risk Management Office's response dismissing Harold's charges as "specious" and accusing him of "trying to manufacture problems that don't exist" — the same charges UC simultaneously investigated and upon which UC terminated the Chief of Police and his command staff.

G. Documented Data Breaches Correlated With Changes to Harold's Status and Records

The following table presents a side-by-side chronological alignment of two independently documented categories of events: (1) events affecting Harold's employment status, disability classification, benefits, and records (left column); and (2) documented data breaches affecting the University of California and Anthem Blue Cross / Blue Shield systems responsible for maintaining those records (right column). All breach information is sourced from the California Attorney General Data Breach Database, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights Breach Portal, official UC and Anthem announcements, court filings, and published investigative reporting.

The reader is invited to draw their own conclusions from the temporal alignment of these independently documented events.

WHAT HAPPENED TO HAROLD	WHAT HAPPENED TO UC/ANTHEM DATA SYSTEMS
PERIOD 1: SETTLEMENT HONORED (2003–2013)
March 2003: Workers' comp case settles. UC begins paying Harold $3,075.98/month tax-free disability income. UC pays health insurance premiums — no deduction from Harold's payments. CCW permit issued.	2003 – January 1, 2014: Anthem Blue Cross is UC's contracted health insurer for Harold and UC employees, retirees, and their dependents.
2002, 2013: UCPD issues and renews Harold's CCW permit, explicitly designating him as "RETIRED." IRS Forms 1099-R (2010–2014) reflect tax-free disability income.	October 2005 – November 2006: UCLA database breached. Approximately 800,000 records compromised. Intrusion undetected for over 13 months. (Breach #1)
PERIOD 2: HAROLD'S STATUS CHANGES / RECORDS DISAPPEAR (2014–2015)
~2014: Third-party adjuster (Gates/Gallagher) contacts Harold, demands medical re-examination. States she "knew nothing about a lawsuit or worker's comp settlement agreement."	February 2014: Anthem mega-breach begins. 78.8 million records compromised, including UC employee "employment information and income data." Attributed to Chinese government-sponsored hackers. Undetected for 11 months. (Breach #7)
Early 2015: UC "At Your Service" states it has NO RECORDS of Harold's workers' comp case or settlement agreement. Proposes converting disability income to service retirement.	September 2014 – May 2015: UCLA Health System breached. 4.5 million patient records compromised. Undetected for 8 months. (Breach #8)
2015: Harold's disability income converted to service retirement income. UC begins deducting health insurance premiums from Harold's monthly payments.	May 2014 – March 2015: Premera Blue Cross breached. 10.4 million records. December 2014 & February 2015: UC Berkeley server breached. (Breaches #6, #9)
2016 forward: IRS Form 1099-R reflects fully taxable retirement income (Distribution Code 7). Premium deductions total approximately $133,000–$150,000 through present.	January 27, 2015: Anthem breach finally discovered. Four major breaches affecting UC/Anthem systems overlap in this exact window.
PERIOD 3: RECORD LOSS ADMITTED / LUSKIN CENTER RESEARCHING HAROLD (2020–2022)
June 2020: UCLA Luskin Center begins eighteen-month research project that will name Harold on pages 35–36 of published report.	December 24, 2020: UC Accellion file transfer system breached. (Breach #13)
February 24, 2021: Ida Fong (UC Benefits) calls Harold. UC system has Harold's son Max erroneously coded as "disabled." Max has never been disabled.	January 12–21, 2021: Two separate Anthem Inc. data breach incidents reported to the California Attorney General. (Breaches #14–15)
March 18, 2021: Ida Fong calls Harold again. Admits "old records were lost and not recovered" during UC computer system upgrades. Cannot locate Harold's disability records.	May 1 – June 30, 2021: Two more Anthem Inc. breach incidents. August 3, 2021: Another Anthem breach incident. (Breaches #16–18)
November 9, 2021: Attorney Edgar Saenz submits formal audit request to Chief Compliance & Audit Officer Alexander Bustamante. Request goes unanswered for over four years.	October 1 & November 4, 2021: Two more Anthem breach incidents. Total: SIX separate Anthem breaches in calendar year 2021 alone. (Breaches #18–19)
March 2022: UCLA Luskin Center publishes report. Pages 35–36 name Harold, document his lawsuits and charges. UCLA has documented institutional knowledge of Harold's case.	April 2021 – January 2024: Blue Shield of California Google Analytics misconfiguration exposes 4.7 million members' protected health information for nearly three years. (Breach #20)
PERIOD 4: CONTINUED DENIALS / HAROLD'S FILE "NOT FOUND" (2023–2026)
August 2023: Lt. Chobanian denies CCW renewal. States Harold was "medically separated on March 1, 1996." Claims review based on Harold's "file" — but UCOP has admitted it does not have Harold's complete file.	May 27–28, 2023: UCLA MOVEit file transfer system breached by CL0P ransomware gang. Faculty, staff, and student records compromised. (Breach #21)
January 31, 2026: Harold submits Second Formal Audit Request documenting all of the above. Scheduled for cancer surgery February 2026.	October 2024 – January 2025: Conduent breach — 14.7+ million records. January 5, 2026: Blue Shield of California record merge error exposes members' PHI during system upgrade. (Breaches #23, #25)

Note: This table documents the most significant of 25 data breach incidents affecting UC/UCLA and Anthem Blue Cross systems between 2005 and 2026. A complete chronological archive with full source citations for each breach is available as a separate document. (See Chapter 05: 25 Data Breaches Exposed the Systems That Were Supposed to Protect Harold's Records.) The correlation between these breaches and the changes to Harold's records does not establish causation. It establishes that the systems responsible for maintaining Harold's records were repeatedly compromised during the same periods when those records changed, disappeared, or were found to contain errors — and that Ida Fong's March 18, 2021 admission that "old records were lost and not recovered" during UC system upgrades is consistent with the documented pattern of data breaches and system vulnerabilities affecting UC and its health insurance partners.

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3. LEGAL ANALYSIS: ISSUES 1 THROUGH 6

ISSUE 1.

WHETHER UCLA'S LUSKIN CENTER FOR HISTORY AND POLICY'S DOCUMENTED KNOWLEDGE OF HAROLD'S CASE CONSTITUTES ACTUAL AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SYSTEM

ISSUE:

Does UCLA's official institutional publication documenting Harold's case, lawsuits, and allegations of discrimination and institutional violence constitute actual and/or constructive notice to the University of California, such that no UC entity can claim ignorance of Harold's history as a whistleblower, his lawsuits against the Regents, or the institutional context of his current dispute?

RULE:

Actual notice exists when information is directly communicated to a party or their authorized agent. Under general agency principles (Restatement (Third) of Agency § 5.03), knowledge held by an agent acting within the scope of their authority is imputed to the principal. The UCLA Luskin Center for History and Policy is an official institutional division of UCLA, itself a campus of the University of California system. Research published by the Luskin Center in March 2022, conducted over eighteen months (June 2020–March 2022) by a team of over a dozen student researchers and supervised by three UCLA professors (Aomar Boum, Eddie Cole, and David N. Myers), constitutes an official institutional knowledge product.

Constructive notice is a legal fiction under which a party is deemed to have received notice whether or not they actually did. (Cornell Law Institute, Legal Information Institute.) Constructive notice arises from the existence of public records and publicly available information. Where information is contained in court filings, published news coverage, or official institutional records, any party exercising reasonable diligence would have discovered it.

Under California Civil Code § 19, "Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact."

APPLICATION:

Actual Notice: The Luskin Center report (pages 35–36), published in March 2022 after eighteen months of institutional research (June 2020–March 2022) by a team of over a dozen graduate and undergraduate student researchers supervised by UCLA Professors Aomar Boum, Eddie Cole, and David N. Myers, specifically names Harold, documents his 1993 lawsuit against UCPD and the Regents, recounts his charges of excessive force and institutional violence, and quotes the UCLA Risk Management Office's response. This report was produced by an official UCLA institutional research center and published as an official UCLA institutional document. Under agency principles, knowledge held by an official institutional division is imputable to the institution itself. UCLA, through its Luskin Center, has documented actual knowledge of Harold's case, his lawsuits, and the institutional response to his charges.

Constructive Notice: Independent of the Luskin Center report, Harold's cases are matters of public record:

Federal case: University Police Officers v. Regents, Case No. 2:96-cv-00396-WDK-AJW, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, filed January 19, 1996.

State tort action: Harold v. The Regents of the University of California, with coverage in the Los Angeles Times on February 25, 1993, and April 24, 1994.

Any UC entity exercising reasonable diligence would have discovered these public records. The Luskin Center report transforms what was already constructive notice through public records into documented actual notice by an official UCLA institutional body. The two forms of notice are cumulative: UC had constructive notice through public records and actual notice through its own institutional publication.

CONCLUSION:

The documented record supports a finding of both actual and constructive notice to the University of California of Harold's case, lawsuits, whistleblowing history, and the institutional context of his current dispute. No UC entity reviewing Harold's file can claim ignorance of his status as a documented whistleblower whose actions resulted in the termination of a police chief and command staff, or of the institutional response documented in UCLA's own published research.

ISSUE 2.

WHETHER UC ENTITIES INFORMED OF HAROLD'S SETTLEMENT TERMS DURING THE POST-SETTLEMENT PERIOD (2009–2026) HAD A LEGAL AND POLICY OBLIGATION TO VERIFY THOSE TERMS AND CORRECT DOCUMENTED DISCREPANCIES

ISSUE:

When multiple UC entities were directly informed by Harold that his workers' compensation settlement included specific terms — including paid health insurance for life and disability retirement status — did those entities have an obligation under UC policy, California law, and fiduciary duty principles to verify those terms and correct any discrepancies, rather than dismissing Harold's claims without investigation?

RULE:

UC Regents Policy 1111 (Standards of Ethical Values and Standards of Ethical Conduct) provides that "Managers and persons in supervisory roles are required to report allegations presented to them and to report suspected" improper governmental activities (IGAs). The policy establishes that all UC employees have an obligation to report waste, fraud, and violations of law.

The California Whistleblower Protection Act for UC Employees (California Government Code § 8547.1 et seq.) provides that state employees, including UC employees, "should be free to report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health without fear of retribution." The Act imposes duties on those receiving such reports.

Under the UC Anti-Discrimination Policy (2024), any UC employee who is not a designated confidential resource is a "Responsible Employee" who "must promptly forward reports of discrimination [and] harassment" to the appropriate office. Supervisors, managers, HR administrators, and faculty have heightened obligations. UC Berkeley's Office for the Prevention of Harassment & Discrimination states: "Employees of UC Berkeley have an obligation to notify the OPHD when they learn, in the course of their work, of possible violations of the UC SVSH Policy and the UC Anti-Discrimination Policy." This framework applies system-wide.

Under the California Constitution, Article IX, § 9, the University of California is established as a public trust. The Regents, as trustees, owe fiduciary duties to beneficiaries including retirees. A fiduciary receiving information about potential violations of a beneficiary's rights has an affirmative duty to investigate and act. California Constitution Article XVI, § 17 establishes that the assets of a retirement system are trust funds to be held and administered solely for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries.

Additionally, ERISA § 510 (29 U.S.C. § 1140) prohibits interference with protected benefits rights. Where an employer directs a participant into a program for which the participant is ineligible while the participant has active coverage, such conduct may constitute interference with protected benefits. (See Chapter 01: The Unqualified Benefits Transfer, citing ERISA § 510 in the context of Harold's direction toward Via Benefits despite active UC High Option coverage.)

Under California Labor Code § 5804, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board retains continuing jurisdiction over workers' compensation settlements. Settlement terms — including paid health insurance for life — cannot be unilaterally modified without WCAB approval or participant consent. (See Chapter 02: The Right to Rescind the Via Benefits Enrollment, establishing five independent rescission grounds under California Civil Code §§ 1689 and 1691 for the unauthorized enrollment change.)

APPLICATION:

The documented record establishes that the following UC entities were directly informed of Harold's settlement terms and his claim that those terms were being violated, and the documented response of each:

1. Thomas Herz, UC Office of the President, Retirement Administration Service Center (2009–2010): Harold wrote to Herz on March 29, 2010: "I have a specific legal settlement with UC that I believe makes me an exemption to the UC insurance rule. I negotiated lifetime medical coverage from UC. Perhaps we should look into this more before we proceed?" Harold further wrote on April 8, 2010: "I would like you to check with your legal department about my settlement before you decide on any action regarding my insurance. I think you will find it was a unique case." Herz's documented response was to dismiss Harold's settlement as a "myth in the oral tradition," state he was "not aware of any settlements" with such terms, and express doubt "that legal counsel would have established this kind of precedent." There is no evidence in the documented record that Herz consulted UC legal counsel as Harold requested.

2. Third-party workers' compensation adjuster (Gates/Gallagher, approximately 2014): Harold informed the adjuster of his settlement. The adjuster stated she "knew nothing about a lawsuit or worker's comp settlement agreement." Rather than verifying, the adjuster threatened to stop Harold's disability payments unless he submitted to a medical examination.

3. UC "At Your Service" (early 2015): Harold contacted At Your Service regarding the threatened cancellation of his disability income. At Your Service "had no records reflecting Mr. Harold's worker's comp case or settlement agreement." Rather than investigating the missing records, At Your Service proposed converting Harold's disability income to service retirement income.

4. Ida Fong, UC Benefits (February 24 and March 18, 2021): Harold informed Fong of his disability status and settlement. Fong admitted that when UC upgraded their computer systems, "old records were lost and not recovered." Fong did not initiate any investigation into the lost records or Harold's claimed disability status. Ms. Fong's admission correlates with 25 documented data breaches affecting UC and Anthem Blue Cross systems between 2005 and 2026, including the Anthem mega-breach of February 2014 (78.8 million records) and the UCLA Health System breach of September 2014–May 2015 (4.5 million records), both of which occurred in the exact period when Harold's records changed and disappeared. (See Section G, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts; see also Chapter 05: 25 Data Breaches Exposed the Systems That Were Supposed to Protect Harold's Records.)

5. Alexander Bustamante, Senior Vice President, Chief Compliance & Audit Officer (November 9, 2021): Attorney Edgar Saenz submitted a formal written audit request by certified mail and email, detailing Harold's entire history, settlement terms, and the 2015 conversion. This request has remained unanswered for over four years.

6. Lt. Jeff Chobanian, UCPD (August 2023): Harold identified himself, cited the LA Times coverage of his case, and stated the CCW was part of a lawsuit settlement. Chobanian responded that Harold was "medically separated" and ineligible under a "UCOP mandate," without addressing the settlement terms Harold raised or the contradiction between the "retired" designation on Harold's previously issued CCW permits and the "medically separated" designation in Chobanian's response.

7. UC RASC (January 31, 2026): Harold submitted the Second Formal Audit Request, documenting all of the above. Response pending.

In each instance, Harold followed UC's own reporting and escalation framework. He reported to the entities responsible for administering his benefits. He provided specific information about his settlement terms. He requested verification. He was a Responsible Employee who had reported institutional misconduct through proper channels — and his reports resulted in the termination of a police chief and command staff. When the system subsequently violated his settlement, he reported that violation through the same institutional channels. Every entity responded with either dismissal, claimed ignorance, or silence.

CONCLUSION:

The documented record supports a finding that each UC entity that received Harold's reports had a legal and policy obligation to verify his claimed settlement terms and correct any discrepancies. Under UC Regents Policy 1111, the California Whistleblower Protection Act, the UC Anti-Discrimination Policy's Responsible Employee framework, ERISA § 510's prohibition on benefits interference, California Labor Code § 5804's continuing WCAB jurisdiction, and the fiduciary duties arising from the California Constitution's treatment of UC as a public trust, these entities were required to investigate, report to compliance, or forward Harold's information to the appropriate office. The documented record does not reflect that any entity did so.

ISSUE 3.

WHETHER THE OCTAGON RISK SERVICES PERMANENT DISABILITY DETERMINATION LETTER CONSTITUTES A BINDING CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT AND WHETHER UC'S UNILATERAL MODIFICATION OF THOSE TERMS CONSTITUTES BREACH OF CONTRACT AND/OR BREACH OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

ISSUE:

Does the Octagon Risk Services letter dated August 8, 2001, establishing Harold's permanent disability rating at $3,075.98 per month tax-free, together with UC's performance under those terms for over a decade, constitute a binding contractual commitment? Does UC's unilateral modification of those terms beginning in 2014–2015 constitute breach of contract and/or breach of promissory estoppel?

RULE:

Breach of Contract: Under California law, the elements of breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) the defendant's breach; and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) A contract may be formed by written agreement, oral agreement, or by conduct. Where one party makes an offer, the other accepts, and both perform under the agreed terms for an extended period, a binding contract exists regardless of whether the original settlement agreement document can be located.

Promissory Estoppel: Under California law, the elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise; (2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) the reliance must be actual and reasonable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by the reliance. (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310.) The doctrine applies even in the absence of a formal written agreement when injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the promise.

Implied-in-Fact Contract: California recognizes implied-in-fact contracts where the parties' conduct demonstrates mutual assent to contract terms. (Retired Employees Ass'n of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171.) Where an employer provides benefits under specific terms for an extended period and the employee relies on those terms, a binding implied contract may arise.

APPLICATION:

The Octagon Letter as Written Manifestation of the Settlement: Even if the original workers' compensation settlement agreement cannot be located (a circumstance UC itself may have caused through the documented record loss admitted by Ida Fong on March 18, 2021), the Octagon Risk Services letter dated August 8, 2001, constitutes a written manifestation of the settlement terms. Octagon was acting as the official claims administrator for UC Los Angeles. The letter establishes a permanent disability rating and calculates specific monthly benefits of $3,075.98 per month tax-free. This is not an interim determination; the letter specifically states the disability was determined to be "permanent and stationary."

UC's Decade of Performance: From 2003 through approximately 2014, UC performed exactly as the settlement terms required. UC paid Harold approximately $3,000 per month in tax-free disability income. UC paid Harold's health insurance premiums without deducting them from his monthly payments. UC issued and renewed Harold's CCW permit. UC filed IRS Forms 1099-R reflecting tax-free disability income classification. This consistent performance over more than a decade confirms both parties' understanding of the settlement terms and constitutes either an express contract (with the Octagon letter as the written manifestation), an implied-in-fact contract (through consistent mutual performance), or at minimum, a clear and unambiguous promise upon which Harold reasonably relied.

Unilateral Modification: Beginning in 2014–2015, UC unilaterally modified these terms without Harold's consent. UC converted Harold's classification from disability income to service retirement income. UC began deducting health insurance premiums from Harold's monthly payments. UC changed the tax classification on Harold's 1099-R from tax-free to fully taxable. UC denied Harold's CCW renewal based on a status classification ("medically separated") that contradicts the "retired" designation on his previously issued permits. None of these changes were authorized by Harold. No amended settlement agreement was executed. Under California Labor Code § 5804, the WCAB retains continuing jurisdiction over these settlement terms, and no modification was sought or obtained through the WCAB.

Detrimental Reliance: Harold relied on UC's performance of the settlement terms by: not pursuing alternative legal remedies during the decade of performance; structuring his family's financial planning around the established income and insurance arrangements; not seeking or maintaining alternative health insurance coverage; and accepting the CCW permit as part of the settlement consideration. The resulting damages include approximately $133,000 to $150,000 in wrongly deducted health insurance premiums, additional federal and state income tax liability from reclassification of disability income as taxable retirement income, loss of CCW privileges that were a condition of the settlement, and the ongoing threat to Harold's medical coverage during scheduled cancer surgery. (See Chapter 07: UC's Own Tax Filings Expose the Switch — $149K in Harm, quantifying the complete financial impact.)

CONCLUSION:

The documented record supports a finding that the Octagon letter, together with UC's decade of consistent performance, constitutes a binding contractual commitment under breach of contract, implied-in-fact contract, and/or promissory estoppel theories. UC's unilateral modification of those terms without Harold's consent, without an amended settlement agreement, without WCAB approval, and in contradiction of UC's own documented actions over more than a decade, constitutes a breach of those obligations. The fact that UC may have lost the original settlement agreement through its own admitted record loss does not relieve UC of its obligations under the terms it performed for over a decade.

ISSUE 4.

WHETHER THE DOCUMENTED PATTERN OF POST-SETTLEMENT INSTITUTIONAL INACTION CONSTITUTES CONSTRUCTIVE RETALIATION AGAINST A DOCUMENTED WHISTLEBLOWER

ISSUE:

Does the documented pattern of institutional indifference, failure to verify, failure to investigate, failure to respond to formal audit requests, and unilateral modification of settlement terms — directed at a documented whistleblower whose actions resulted in the termination of a police chief and command staff — constitute constructive retaliation under California law?

RULE:

California Labor Code § 1102.5 prohibits retaliation against employees who report violations of law. Under Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, the California Supreme Court held that the employee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that whistleblowing was a "contributing factor" in the employer's alleged adverse action. The burden then shifts to the employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the action would have occurred regardless of the whistleblowing.

The concept of "constructive" adverse action is well-established in California employment law. Wrongful constructive termination occurs when an employer makes working conditions so intolerable that an employee has no choice but to resign. By direct analogy, constructive retaliation occurs when an institution achieves the functional equivalent of deliberate retaliation through systematic inaction, indifference, and failure to honor obligations owed to a known whistleblower.

California Labor Code § 132a declares it the policy of this state that "there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment." The statute makes it unlawful for any employer to discharge, threaten to discharge, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed or made known an intention to file a claim for workers' compensation, or because the employee has received a rating, award, or settlement. Harold received all three: a permanent disability rating from Octagon Risk Services on August 8, 2001 (6¾%, $3,075.98/month tax-free); a Duty Disability Income award paid by UC from 1996 through 2015; and a workers' compensation settlement in March 2003 that included lifetime paid health insurance, a CCW permit, and a $10,000 lump sum payment. UC honored every term of that settlement for over a decade before unilaterally modifying the terms beginning in 2014–2015. A separate petition pursuant to Labor Code § 132a has been filed with the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board incorporating the documented facts set forth in this evidentiary package. (See Chapter 12: The Workers' Compensation Case That Was Never Properly Closed and the § 132a Petition It Produced.)

The California Whistleblower Protection Act for UC employees (Government Code § 8547.1 et seq.) provides specific protections and imposes duties on those receiving reports of improper governmental activities.

The Peace Officers Bill of Rights (POBR), California Government Code §§ 3300–3312, provides additional protections for sworn peace officers. Government Code § 3305 (the anti-shadow-file provision) prohibits any comment adverse to the officer's interest from being entered in the officer's personnel file without the officer being notified and given an opportunity to respond. Government Code § 3304 prohibits punitive action against a public safety officer without providing the officer an opportunity for an administrative appeal, consistent with the due process requirements established in Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 and Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532. The reclassification of Harold's status from disability to retirement income, the commencement of premium deductions, and the denial of CCW privileges each constitute "punitive action" under POBR — yet Harold received no pre-deprivation notice or opportunity to respond.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, every person who, under color of state law, subjects any citizen to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured. UC officials who participated in the unilateral modification of settlement terms, the denial of due process protections, and the failure to investigate documented compliance concerns may face personal liability exposure under § 1983 for actions taken under color of state authority. (See Chapter 06: Schrödinger's Retiree — Ten Contradictions UC Cannot Reconcile, documenting the contradictory status classifications that evidence arbitrary and capricious state action.)

APPLICATION:

The documented record establishes the following chronological pattern:

Step 1 — Documented Whistleblower Status: Harold is a documented whistleblower whose actions resulted in the termination of a UCLA Police Department chief and command staff. This is established by: (a) the Luskin Center report (pages 35–36), which is UCLA's own institutional documentation; (b) Los Angeles Times coverage (February 25, 1993, and April 24, 1994); (c) federal and state court records. The University of California had actual and constructive notice of Harold's whistleblower status (see Issue I).

Step 1A — Pre-Settlement Pattern of Active Institutional Retaliation, Fabrication, and Suppression (1992–2001)

Before the 2003 settlement, before the post-settlement institutional indifference documented in Steps 2 through 5, the University of California engaged in a documented pattern of active retaliation against Harold that included fabrication of evidence, suppression of a whistleblower website through judicial proceedings, refusal to pay an officer injured on duty, and false statements to third parties that caused Harold to lose his home. This pre-settlement pattern is documented by physical evidence, court records, Internet Archive captures, four independent newspaper investigations across three UC campuses, and UCLA’s own institutional academic archive. It establishes that the post-settlement conduct documented in Steps 2 through 5 is not an isolated pattern but a continuation of institutional behavior spanning over three decades.

Harold’s whistleblowing activities were directed at misconduct and civil rights violations by UCLA police command staff — not the rank-and-file officers he served alongside. Harold has consistently maintained that the line officers were professional and dedicated. His co-plaintiffs in both the tort action (SC022125) and the federal FLSA case (2:96-cv-00396) were fellow officers — victims of the same command staff misconduct Harold was reporting. The LA Times characterized the dynamic on April 24, 1994: UCLA’s “59-Member Department Maintains Peace Everywhere on Campus Except Within Its Own Ranks.” The institutional failure was at the leadership level.

A. Four Independent Newspaper Investigations Document a System-Wide Pattern Across Three UC Campuses (1992–1994)

During the period Harold was engaged in whistleblowing activities at UCLA, four independent campus newspaper investigations — conducted by student journalists at three separate UC campuses who were not coordinating with each other — documented the same categories of institutional misconduct Harold was reporting internally:

October 19, 1992 — The California Aggie (UC Davis): Published an investigation documenting allegations of racial profiling, excessive force, and inadequate oversight at the UC Davis Police Department. The investigation identified patterns of conduct toward minority students and community members that paralleled the allegations Harold was filing internally at UCLA during the same period. The article was published during UC President Jack Peltason’s inauguration at UC Davis on October 19, 1992 — the same Jack Peltason to whom Harold had reported his audit findings regarding missing police vehicles and financial irregularities. At that inauguration, UCLA Chancellor Charles Young — the Chancellor whose residence Harold had mailed formal complaints to — publicly dismissed student protesters as “lying and distorting truth.” Chancellor Young made these remarks while UCLA police deployed in riot gear outside the ceremony.

May 18, 1993 — The Highlander (UC Riverside): Published an investigation documenting allegations of racial discrimination, excessive force, and retaliation at the UC Riverside Police Department. The Highlander investigation independently identified the same institutional patterns at a third UC campus — racial profiling, disproportionate use of force against minority individuals, and retaliation against those who complained — during the same time period Harold was experiencing and documenting identical patterns at UCLA.

March 16, 1994 — The Corsair (Santa Monica College), Part I: Published the first installment of a two-part investigative series focused directly on the UCLA Police Department. The Corsair investigation documented Harold’s whistleblowing activities, including his reports of missing police vehicles sold for cash, federal asset seizure violations, officers being paid who no longer worked for the department, and the institutional retaliation he experienced after reporting these findings. The article documented Harold’s role as founding president of FUPOA and the institutional response to his complaints.

March 23, 1994 — The Corsair (Santa Monica College), Part II: Published the second installment of the investigative series. Part II documented additional details of the institutional retaliation Harold experienced, including false disciplinary write-ups, interference with outside employment, and the broader pattern of command staff misconduct that Harold’s whistleblowing had exposed. The Corsair documented that on or about March 20, 1991 — seventeen days after the Rodney King beating — UCPD Sergeant Alan R. Cueba issued a departmental memorandum stating that “brutality will not be tolerated” and promising accountability (Luskin Center, p. 35, fn. 164). Alan R. Cueba is a named defendant in Harold v. The Regents of the University of California, Case No. SC022125, filed January 29, 1993. Per the contemporaneous press accounts, the same Cueba who authored the accountability memo refused to accept formal complaints from citizens who reported the very conduct the memo promised to prevent. Alan Lieban of UCLA Risk Management was quoted dismissing Harold’s charges as “specious” and claiming Harold was “trying to manufacture problems that don’t exist.” This is the same UCLA Risk Management office that would later be involved in administering Harold’s workers’ compensation claim arising from his on-duty injury.

Significance: Four independent investigations by three campus newspapers across the UC system documented the same categories of institutional misconduct during the same time period. These were not coordinated investigations. Each campus newspaper independently found the same patterns: racial profiling, excessive force, retaliation against complainants, and institutional dismissal of documented concerns. UCLA’s institutional response — Chancellor Young publicly calling protesters liars, Risk Management dismissing charges as “specious” — established the institutional posture toward whistleblowers that the post-settlement conduct documented in Steps 2 through 5 continued.

(Documents: UC Davis California Aggie, October 19, 1992; UC Riverside Highlander, May 18, 1993; Santa Monica College Corsair, March 16, 1994 and March 23, 1994. Physical copies in evidence file. See also: UCLA Luskin Center for History and Policy, “The History of Racism and the Quest for Racial Justice at UCLA,” March 2022, which cites the Corsair articles at footnotes 147–164.)

B. UCLA Assigned a Police Supervisor, Accused of Assault in Harold’s Lawsuit, to Investigate Harold — That Officer Fabricated Evidence, Was Caught, and Was Terminated (Approximately 1995)

While Harold was on paid administrative leave, UCLA Police Department assigned Lieutenant Michael Shain to conduct an internal investigation of Harold. Lt. Shain’s investigation report alleged that Harold had displayed his personal firearm and police identification to obtain information from a bank.

The assignment itself raises institutional concerns. Lt. Shain was named in Harold’s pending state tort action (Harold v. The Regents of the University of California). Harold’s lawsuit alleged that Lt. Shain had committed assault and battery against African-American individuals in May 1991 and January 1992. Lt. Shain was also the officer UCLA assigned to investigate Officer Duren’s excessive force complaints filed by UCLA students William Dilworth and Otis Bryan. UCLA assigned an officer who was the subject of Harold’s pending civil rights and whistleblower lawsuit to investigate Harold.

The student cases Shain was assigned to investigate: During the same period, the Luskin Center documents (pp. 34–35) that Black UCLA students Alex Dilworth (dental school) and Darren Bryan (economics) separately filed claims against UCPD officers for racial profiling, unlawful arrest, and excessive force. Dilworth was studying in the Dental School student lounge when an officer approached, demanded identification, and asked Dilworth if he was “in a gang.” Dilworth was arrested twice for “uncollected warrants” and missed his final exams. Bryan was approached by a UCPD officer and asked for identification; Bryan refused, as was his right. Bryan was arrested and charged with battering a police officer. Bryan spent two days in jail due to a warrant for overdue traffic tickets. Both students were referred by the Afrikan Student Union to attorney John Caldwell Jr. Separately, Robert Sims, a Santa Monica College photography student, filed a lawsuit on January 19, 1993, alleging excessive force by Officers Terrence Duren and Vernelle Mackbee during an encounter while Sims was photographing a tree (Corsair Part I, March 16, 1994). Officer Duren is both a co-plaintiff with Harold in the tort action (SC022125) and a consent plaintiff in the federal FLSA action. These student cases were occurring while Shain was simultaneously fabricating the investigation to terminate Harold.

Physical evidence proved the investigation report was fabricated. Harold obtained a copy of the UCPD Property Sheet Log from the UCLA Police Department Property Division. The Property Sheet Log documented that Lieutenant Boyarski had taken possession of Harold’s personal weapon, badge, and police identification approximately one year before the date of the alleged bank incident in Shain’s report. Harold did not have his gun, badge, or police identification at the time Shain’s report alleged he used them at a bank. The UCLA Police Department had them in its own property room, per its own official property records.

The Skelly hearing. Chief Chapman convened a pre-termination due process hearing consistent with the requirements of Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194. Chief Chapman informed Harold that he intended to terminate Harold’s employment and asked if Harold had anything to say. Harold produced the UCPD Property Sheet Log and asked where his gun and police identification were, since the department’s own records showed Lt. Boyarski had taken possession of them a year before the alleged incident. Chief Chapman responded: “This conversation is over.” Chapman ended the hearing and walked out.

Outcome: Harold was not terminated. Harold was reinstated to full active duty. Lieutenant Michael Shain was terminated from the UCLA Police Department for falsifying the investigation report. Harold’s personal weapon and police identification were subsequently “found” by the department.

The integrity of Shain’s other investigations: The documented fabrication and termination of Lt. Shain raises questions about the integrity of every other investigation he conducted during his tenure. During the same period, the Corsair documented that Shain “used unreasonable force and committed assault and battery against African American individuals multiple times” (Luskin Center, p. 35, fn. 164). Any internal affairs investigation conducted by Shain — including any investigation of Officer Terrence Duren, a co-plaintiff with Harold in the tort action and the subject of the Robert Sims lawsuit (Corsair Part I, March 16, 1994) — is now subject to question based on Shain’s documented pattern of fabrication in official proceedings.

Significance to the retaliation pattern: The Shain investigation demonstrates that UCLA’s institutional response to Harold’s whistleblowing included the fabrication of evidence by an officer who was himself a subject of Harold’s civil rights complaints. The same officer UCLA assigned to investigate Harold’s allegations about excessive force against minority individuals was the officer UCLA assigned to build the case to terminate Harold. When the fabrication was exposed by UCLA’s own property records, the investigation collapsed and the investigating officer was terminated. The documented question is whether an institution that fabricated evidence to terminate a whistleblower in the 1990s is the same institution that “lost” that whistleblower’s workers’ compensation and disability records during computer system upgrades in the 2010s.

(Documents: UCPD Property Sheet Log showing Lt. Boyarski’s possession of Harold’s personal weapon, badge, and police ID; Skelly hearing record; Lt. Shain termination; Luskin Center pp. 34–35. See also Chapter 10: Master Evidence Index.)

C. UCLA Used Trademark Enforcement and Court-Ordered Contempt Proceedings to Suppress Harold’s Whistleblower Website (Approximately 1998–1999)

During the period between Harold’s on-duty injury (February 16, 1996) and his workers’ compensation settlement (March 2003), Harold created a website at the domain BruinWatch.org. The website posted publicly available information about the University of California system, including a list of all 1,500 properties UC owned in California — at that time, the second-largest landowner in the state after the federal government. Among the information published on the site was documentation of UC Davis purchasing land surrounding a property owner’s lakefront easements, effectively landlocking the owner to force a sale.

Internet Archive verification: The Wayback Machine at web.archive.org confirms that BruinWatch.org existed and was captured by the Internet Archive. The main site (http://www.bruinwatch.org:80/) was first captured on December 5, 1998, and last captured on April 30, 1999 (six captures, five duplicates, one unique). The robots.txt file (http://bruinwatch.org:80/robots.txt) was first captured on September 18, 1999, and last captured on August 31, 2007 (nine captures, one duplicate, eight uniques). The main site going dark between December 1998 and April 1999 is consistent with the court-ordered removal described below.

UCLA’s response was not to address the content of BruinWatch.org but to suppress it. UCLA ordered Harold to take down the website, citing California Education Code Section 92000 and claiming that the word “Bruin” was a registered trademark of the University of California. UCLA took Harold to court in the Santa Monica Superior Court. The court ordered Harold to remove the website or face arrest on criminal charges for contempt of court. Harold’s attorney advised compliance. Harold took down the website.

The legal basis UCLA cited to suppress BruinWatch.org raises documented questions when examined against the statute’s own text and the federal trademark record: .

California Education Code Section 92000. The statute, enacted in 1976 and last updated January 1, 1982, provides: “Any person who uses the name ‘University of California’ or any abbreviation of it or any name of which these words are a part, in any way, in connection with any enterprise, institution, business or other undertaking, without the permission of the Regents of the University of California, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” The word “Bruin” is not “University of California.” The word “Bruin” is not an abbreviation of “University of California.” The word “Bruin” is not a name “of which these words are a part.” The domain “BruinWatch.org” does not contain the words “University of California” or any abbreviation thereof. By the statute’s own text, Section 92000 does not cover the word “Bruin.” .

Harold was already aware of Section 92000’s scope and had previously complied with it. When Harold founded his police officers’ association, he initially named it the “University Police Officers Association.” Because that name contained the word “University” — which is part of “University of California” — Harold changed the name to the “Federated University Police Officers Association” (FUPOA) to comply with Section 92000. Harold understood the statute, knew what it covered, and complied where it actually applied. The word “Bruin” does not trigger Section 92000 by the statute’s own terms. .

Federal trademark registrations. UCLA’s Office of Campus Counsel currently states on its website: “The Regents of the University of California also owns Federal Trademark Registrations on ‘UCLA’ and ‘UCLA Bruins’ in both block and script style in nearly all consumer product categories.” The earliest confirmed UCLA federal trademark registration is Serial Number 73219810, filed June 15, 1979, covering clothing. Campus Counsel’s own statement identifies registrations for “UCLA” and “UCLA Bruins” — not for “Bruin” standing alone. For the standalone word “Bruins,” Campus Counsel uses different language: “The Regents claims rights to all graphic representations of UCLA, University of California Los Angeles, Bruins, Campus mascot illustrations.” A “claim” of rights is not the same as a federal trademark registration. No standalone federal trademark registration for the word “Bruin” has been located in USPTO records as of the date of this document.

First Amendment protections. At the time UCLA obtained the court order against BruinWatch.org (approximately 1998–1999), First Amendment protections for noncommercial speech about public institutions were well established in federal case law. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that public employees speaking as citizens on matters of public concern retain First Amendment protection, and that speech on “matters of legitimate public concern” should be subject to “free and open debate.” In Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit held that trademark law applies to expressive works “only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.” BruinWatch.org was not selling goods or services. BruinWatch.org was not creating consumer confusion about UCLA products. BruinWatch.org was posting publicly available records about a public trust institution funded by California taxpayers. Harold, who has been an active journalist with Security Guy TV since 2013 producing over 3,000 podcasts, was exercising press and speech rights to report on documented institutional conduct.

UC’s current public property database. UC now publishes its own systemwide real property database through the UC Office of the President’s Real Estate Services & Strategies (RESS) division at ucop.edu. The RESS database is described as “a systemwide database of real property owned by the Regents of the University of California for university-related purposes.” The most recent University of California Real Property Portfolio report is dated July 2023. The same category of public property information that Harold was suppressed from publishing through BruinWatch.org in 1998–1999 is now information UC itself publishes voluntarily through its own online database.

Significance to the retaliation pattern: UCLA cited a statute that does not cover the word “Bruin” by its own text and trademark claims for which no standalone federal registration has been located to obtain a court order suppressing a whistleblower’s website that posted publicly available information about UC institutional conduct. UCLA did not dispute the accuracy of the information posted on BruinWatch.org. UCLA did not address the substantive content documenting UC property transactions and institutional conduct. UCLA’s institutional response was to suppress the publication through legal process, using the threat of criminal contempt to silence a documented whistleblower who had already demonstrated his understanding of and compliance with Section 92000 by renaming his union to FUPOA. The same institution that suppressed Harold’s publication of UC property records in 1998–1999 now publishes the same category of property information through its own public database at ucop.edu. And this is the same institution that now claims it has no records of that whistleblower’s workers’ compensation settlement, no records of his disability status, and no records of his personnel file.

(Documents: Internet Archive / Wayback Machine captures of BruinWatch.org, December 5, 1998 through August 31, 2007; UCLA Policy 110 — Use of the University’s Names, Seals, and UCLA Trademarks; California Education Code § 92000 (enacted 1976, last updated January 1, 1982); UCLA Office of Campus Counsel, “Use of the University Name, Seal and Logos” (campuscounsel.ucla.edu); USPTO trademark records, Serial Number 73219810 (“UCLA” mark, filed June 15, 1979); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989); UCOP Real Estate Services & Strategies, University of California Real Property Portfolio (July 2023), available at ucop.edu/real-estate-services/resources/real-property-data/. Court records from Santa Monica Superior Court contempt proceedings available through Los Angeles County Superior Court clerk.)

D. UCLA Simultaneously Refused to Pay Harold IOD Benefits and Refused to Allow Him to Return to Light Duty (1996–2001)

On February 16, 1996, Harold was injured on duty while in uniform, during a radio call dispatched by UCPD. He was transported by ambulance to the Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center, where a physician diagnosed a torn meniscus, back injuries, and additional injuries. The physician placed Harold on medical leave.

Approximately one month later, Harold went to the UCLA Police Department to pick up his regular monthly paycheck. The Chief of Police told Harold he would not receive a paycheck because “it was not clear” his injury happened on duty — notwithstanding that Harold was in uniform, on a dispatched radio call, and transported to UCLA Medical Center by ambulance.

Harold’s attorney sent a letter to UCLA presenting two options: either pay Harold his Injured on Duty (IOD) benefits as required, or return him to work on light duty. Harold was willing to perform light duty. UCLA refused both options. UCLA would neither pay the injured officer nor allow him to work.

False statement to third party causing loss of home: During this period of unpaid medical leave, Harold’s mortgage company called the UCLA Police Department Chief’s office to verify Harold’s employment status for a home refinance. The Chief’s secretary told the mortgage company that Harold was “no longer employed by the police department.” This statement was false. Harold was on medical leave; he had not resigned and had not been terminated. As a direct result of this false statement, Harold lost the refinance. Harold subsequently lost his home and was forced to file bankruptcy. Harold’s wife suffered a miscarriage of their third child during this period of financial crisis.

Administrative complaints: Harold filed complaints with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH, now the Civil Rights Department). The DFEH investigated Harold’s complaint and issued a right-to-sue letter. These administrative filings document Harold’s use of every available institutional and regulatory channel prior to judicial remedies. The DFEH’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter after investigation represents an independent state agency’s determination that sufficient cause existed to proceed.

The tort case and the bankruptcy: Harold and co-plaintiffs filed Harold v. The Regents of the University of California, Case No. SC022125, in Santa Monica Superior Court on January 29, 1993. During the period of unpaid medical leave, Harold was forced to file bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court seized the pending state tort action as an asset. UC settled with the bankruptcy court for approximately $50,000 to pay Harold’s creditors. Harold received no money personally from the state tort action. Harold never signed a settlement agreement in that case, leaving the case technically open for future claims of harassment. The absence of a signed personal settlement agreement means Harold’s individual tort claims were never personally released.

In March 1996, Harold began working for the Fox Broadcasting Company because UCLA had cut off his pay while he was injured on duty. Between March 1996 and August 2001, Harold received no regular pay from UCLA, no workers’ compensation benefits, and no disability benefits — yet UCLA continued to carry him on their books as being on leave. When command staff later attempted to characterize Harold’s Fox employment as a voluntary resignation, this characterization was contradicted by the documented record: Harold never resigned. Harold requested, in writing through his attorney, to be returned to active service on multiple occasions.

In December 2002, Harold transitioned from the Fox Broadcasting Company to the Walt Disney Company, continuing his professional career in the entertainment industry. Harold maintained productive employment throughout the period UCLA claims he was “medically separated” and had no active relationship with the university.

The workers’ compensation resolution: On August 8, 2001 — five years and five months after the on-duty injury — Octagon Risk Services, Inc. (a St. Paul member company), through Claim Account Executive Grace McAdams, issued a permanent disability determination establishing Harold’s benefits at $2,835.00 per month plus $240.98, totaling $3,075.98 per month, tax-free, with 85% payable pending final settlement. During the entire period from February 16, 1996 through August 8, 2001, Harold received no regular pay from UCLA, no workers’ compensation payments, and no disability benefits while UCLA continued to carry him on their books as on leave. (Octagon Risk Services letter, August 8, 2001.)

Significance to the retaliation pattern: UCLA’s conduct toward Harold following his on-duty injury created the very conditions that led to the workers’ compensation settlement whose terms UC later claimed to have no records of. UCLA refused to pay an officer who was injured in uniform on a dispatched radio call, refused to allow him to return to light duty, made a false statement to his mortgage company that caused him to lose his home, and then carried him on their books for five years without pay or benefits. The 2003 workers’ compensation settlement was the resolution of this institutional conduct. The post-settlement pattern documented in Steps 2 through 5 — where UC systematically undermined the terms of that settlement — must be read against this documented pre-settlement history of active institutional retaliation.

(Documents: Attorney letter to UCLA demanding IOD pay or light duty return; Octagon Risk Services Notice dated August 8, 2001, establishing permanent disability at $3,075.98/month tax-free; Harold’s March 12, 2021 letter to Ida Fong documenting complete chronology; EEOC and DFEH complaint records. See Chapter 12: The Workers’ Compensation Case That Was Never Properly Closed.)

E. The Documented Three-Decade Pattern: When Evidence Supports Harold, It Disappears; When Fabricated Evidence Is Needed Against Harold, It Materializes

The pre-settlement and post-settlement records establish a documented pattern spanning more than thirty years in which institutional evidence behaves in a consistent and directional manner:

1990s — Physical items that would support Harold: Harold’s personal weapon, badge, and police identification were taken into UCPD custody by Lt. Boyarski and logged in the department Property Sheet Log. When Lt. Shain’s fabricated investigation required Harold to have possessed these items at a bank, the department acted as though Harold had them — until Harold produced the property log proving otherwise. After the Skelly hearing collapsed, the items were “found.”

1990s — Institutional records that would document Harold’s complaints: Acting Chief Karl Ross subsequently stated that Harold’s personnel file was destroyed. Assistant Chief Alan R. Cueba issued a March 20, 1991 memorandum stating “brutality will not be tolerated,” while Harold’s lawsuit alleges Cueba refused to accept formal complaints from citizens who reported harassment. Chancellor Young publicly dismissed complaints as lies. Risk Management dismissed charges as “specious.”

1998–1999 — A website that documented UC misconduct: BruinWatch.org was ordered removed through court-enforced proceedings citing California Education Code § 92000 and trademark claims. Section 92000 does not cover the word “Bruin” by its own statutory text, and no standalone federal trademark registration for “Bruin” has been located. The content was suppressed; the institutional conduct it documented was not addressed. UC now publishes the same category of property information through its own public database at ucop.edu.

2014–2015 — Records that would confirm Harold’s settlement terms: A third-party workers’ compensation adjuster “knew nothing about a settlement agreement.” UC “At Your Service” had “no records reflecting” Harold’s workers’ compensation case. Harold’s disability classification was changed from tax-free to fully taxable. Insurance premium deductions were added without his consent.

2021 — Computer records that would document Harold’s original status: Ida Fong confirmed that “old records were lost and not recovered” during UC computer system upgrades. Simultaneously, Harold’s non-disabled son Max was erroneously coded as “disabled” in UC’s system while Harold’s own permanent disability classification had been removed.

2021–2026 — Formal audit requests seeking to locate and verify records: Attorney Saenz’s November 9, 2021 certified-mail audit request to Chief Compliance Officer Bustamante has remained unanswered for over four years. Harold’s January 31, 2026 Second Formal Audit Request to RASC awaits response. Captain Chobanian’s February 18, 2026 records production deadline passed without compliance.

The direction is consistent across three decades: when institutional records, evidence, or documentation supports Harold’s position, it becomes unavailable through destruction, loss, fabrication, suppression, or institutional silence. The factfinder is invited to evaluate whether this thirty-year directional pattern is coincidental or consistent with the constructive retaliation analyzed in this Issue.

(Cross-Reference: Chapter 05: 25 Data Breaches Exposed the Systems; Chapter 06: Ten Contradictions UC Cannot Reconcile; Chapter 09: Second Formal Demand After Four Years of Silence; Chapter 10: Master Evidence Index and Court Records.)

Step 2 — Settlement as Resolution: Harold's workers' compensation case settled in March 2003 with specific terms including disability retirement, paid health insurance for life, and a CCW permit. UC performed under these terms for over a decade (2003–2014). The settlement represented the resolution of the institutional harm caused by the retaliatory conduct Harold experienced.

Step 3 — Systematic Undermining: Beginning in 2009–2010 (Thomas Herz correspondence) and accelerating in 2014–2015, UC entities began systematically undermining the settlement terms. UC pressured Harold to apply for SSDI. UC demanded medical re-examinations not required by the settlement. UC converted Harold's disability income to retirement income. UC began deducting health insurance premiums. UC changed his tax classification. UC denied his CCW renewal. Each of these actions constitutes punitive action under POBR (Gov. Code § 3304) for which Harold received no pre-deprivation notice or administrative appeal.

Step 4 — Reporting Met With Institutional Indifference: When Harold reported these violations to multiple UC entities (Thomas Herz, the third-party adjuster, At Your Service, Ida Fong, Alexander Bustamante through attorney Saenz, Lt. Chobanian), each entity responded with either: (a) dismissal ("myths in the oral tradition"); (b) claimed ignorance ("knew nothing about a settlement"); (c) claimed record loss ("old records were lost and not recovered"); or (d) silence (four years without response to a formal audit request from an attorney). (See Chapter 04: Six Recorded Calls Capture UC Agents Admitting Coverage Failures on Tape, preserving institutional admissions on three independent recording systems.)

Step 5 — Effect Identical to Deliberate Retaliation: The practical effect on Harold is identical whether UC deliberately retaliated or refused to investigate and correct after being told. The result is the same: approximately $133,000 to $150,000 in wrongly deducted premiums; reclassification from tax-free disability income to fully taxable retirement income with resulting additional tax liability; loss of CCW privileges that were a settlement condition; and ongoing threat to medical coverage during cancer treatment.

The question for a factfinder is this: When an institution knows that a person is a documented whistleblower (UCLA's own Luskin Center published it), knows that person has a settlement arising from discrimination and retaliation (the court records are public), and then systematically fails to honor that settlement, fails to investigate when told of violations, and fails to respond to formal audit demands from an attorney for over four years — is the institutional inaction the functional equivalent of retaliation?

CONCLUSION:

The documented record supports a finding that the pattern of institutional conduct described above could constitute constructive retaliation under California law, including violations of POBR due process protections (Gov. Code §§ 3304–3305) and potential personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whether the conduct was deliberate or the product of institutional indifference, the effect on Harold is identical: the systematic destruction of the benefits he received as resolution of documented discrimination and whistleblower retaliation. A factfinder could reasonably conclude that Harold's whistleblowing was a "contributing factor" in the adverse actions, shifting the burden to UC to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the same actions would have occurred regardless.

ISSUE 5.

WHETHER UC'S RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 2020 GOLD BOOK POLICY TO DENY CCW PRIVILEGES PREVIOUSLY GRANTED UNDER EARLIER STANDARDS DEMONSTRATES CONTRADICTORY STATUS CLASSIFICATIONS AND RAISES DUE PROCESS CONCERNS

ISSUE:

Does UC's application of the Gold Book Policy 1700.1, dated August 18, 2020, to deny CCW privileges that were previously granted and renewed under earlier policy standards constitute a retroactive policy application raising due process concerns, and does the contradiction between the "retired" designation on Harold's previously issued permits and the "medically separated" designation in the 2023 denial further demonstrate UC's contradictory status classifications?

RULE:

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, §§ 7 and 15 of the California Constitution, prohibit the retroactive application of laws and policies that deprive individuals of vested rights without due process. While the ex post facto clause applies specifically to criminal statutes, the broader due process protections apply to administrative actions that retroactively deprive individuals of established benefits or privileges.

Under California Penal Code § 25455, peace officers who are "honorably retired" shall be issued an identification certificate with a CCW endorsement by the law enforcement agency from which the officer retired. California Penal Code § 16690 defines "honorably retired" to include officers who have qualified for and accepted a service or disability retirement.

UCLA PD Policy 209 (Section 209.4(a)) states: "For the purpose of this policy, honorably retired includes all peace officers who have qualified for, and accepted, a service or disability retirement. It shall not include any officer who retires in lieu of termination."

The Gold Book Policy 1700.1 (dated August 18, 2020) provides at Section 1700.1(b)(1): "An officer receiving duty disability income has not retired or separated from the University of California and is therefore not eligible for a retiree identification card or retiree CCW privileges and is not considered a 'qualified retired and separated peace officer.'"

APPLICATION:

The documentary record reveals the following contradictions:

Contradiction 1 — "Retired" vs. "Medically Separated": Harold's CCW permit, issued on August 29, 2002, and reissued on August 29, 2013, explicitly identifies him as a "retired officer" of the University of California Police Department, issued pursuant to California Penal Code sections 25455, 25460, and 25465. The Chief of Police signed the permit. On August 25, 2023, Lt. Chobanian stated Harold's "status was designated as medically separated on March 1, 1996." If Harold was "medically separated" in 1996, then Chief Chapman should never have issued the CCW in 2002 under the standards then in effect, and should never have reissued it in 2013. Either the 2002 and 2013 issuances were proper (meaning Harold was "retired"), or they were improper (meaning the Chief of Police violated policy) — but UC cannot have it both ways. (See Chapter 06: Schrödinger's Retiree — Ten Contradictions UC Cannot Reconcile, Contradiction 6.)

Contradiction 2 — Policy 209 vs. Gold Book 1700.1: UCLA PD Policy 209, under which Harold's CCW was issued and renewed, explicitly includes disability retirement as honorable retirement eligible for CCW. The 2020 Gold Book Policy 1700.1 explicitly excludes officers receiving duty disability income from CCW eligibility. These two policies are mutually exclusive as applied to Harold. The 2020 Gold Book was applied retroactively to invalidate permits that were properly issued under the earlier standard.

Contradiction 3 — The Jacobs v. Regents Irony: Lt. Chobanian attached the appellate decision in Jacobs v. The Regents of the University of California as authority for denying Harold's CCW. Jacobs involved claims by officers associated with FUPOA — the Federated University Police Officers' Association that Harold founded. UC is now using case law arising from the organization Harold created as a basis to deny Harold himself the benefits his settlement guaranteed.

Contradiction 4 — Tax Classification vs. CCW Classification: UC simultaneously classifies Harold as a "retiree" for tax purposes (IRS Form 1099-R, Distribution Code 7, "Normal Distribution" from a retirement plan, 2016 forward) while classifying him as "medically separated" and "not retired" for CCW purposes. These classifications are mutually exclusive. Harold cannot simultaneously be retired (for tax purposes) and not retired (for CCW purposes). (See Chapter 07: UC's Own Tax Filings Expose the Switch — $149K in Harm, documenting the year-by-year 1099-R distribution code analysis.)

CONCLUSION:

The documented record demonstrates that UC maintains contradictory status classifications for Harold depending on which classification serves UC's institutional interest in a given context. Harold is "retired" when it benefits UC to classify him as retired (tax treatment, service retirement instead of disability), and "not retired" when it benefits UC to classify him otherwise (CCW denial). The retroactive application of the 2020 Gold Book Policy to invalidate permits properly issued under earlier standards raises due process concerns under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the California Constitution, as well as POBR violations under Government Code §§ 3304–3305, and further demonstrates the systematic contradictions that pervade Harold's file. These contradictions can only be resolved through the audit and reconciliation process Harold has repeatedly requested.

ISSUE 6.

WHETHER THE DOCUMENTED RECORD ESTABLISHES REASONABLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DISCOVERY, INCLUDING SUBPOENAS OF INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

ISSUE:

Does the documented record presented in Issues I through V establish reasonable and probable cause sufficient to warrant discovery, including subpoenas of internal UC communications and records, to determine the full scope of institutional knowledge, decision-making, and potential violations?

RULE:

Under the California Code of Civil Procedure § 2017.010, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The threshold for discovery is reasonable and probable cause to believe that responsive documents exist and would be relevant to the claims at issue.

Under the UC Internal Audit Charter, the UC Internal Audit Department has unrestricted access to all University activities, records, properties, and personnel needed to complete its work. The Charter establishes that internal audit shall have sufficient authority to fulfill its duties.

Under Government Code § 8547.7 (Whistleblower Protection), the University of California is required to maintain records and respond to audit requests related to potential improper governmental activities.

Under the California Constitution, Article IX, Section 9, the University of California constitutes a “public trust” administered by the Regents. The Regents have “full powers of organization and government” and are subject to legislative control for security of funds and compliance with terms.

Under California Government Code § 8546.7, every contract involving expenditure of public funds exceeding $10,000 shall be subject to examination and audit by the California State Auditor. The Legislature specifically intended this provision to apply to the Regents of the University of California.

Under Regents Policy 7503 (Compliance with State Audits), the Chief Compliance and Audit Officer is responsible for State Auditor coordination. The policy includes a prohibition on interference with protected disclosure to the State Auditor.

Under UCRP fiduciary responsibilities, plan fiduciaries must act prudently and solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. Plan administrators must maintain records sufficient to determine benefits due. Participant-level benefit determinations must be kept until the plan has paid all benefits. Failure to maintain records can constitute breach of fiduciary duty.

APPLICATION:

The documented record presented in this memorandum establishes reasonable and probable cause to believe that responsive documents exist in at least seven categories:

Category A — Third-Party Adjuster Internal Communications: Emails, memoranda, and notes between the third-party workers' compensation adjuster (Gates/Gallagher) and UC benefits administration discussing Harold's case, his claims regarding his settlement, and instructions on handling his file. The documented record establishes that the adjuster told Harold she "knew nothing about a lawsuit or worker's comp settlement agreement" — raising the question of what information UC provided (or failed to provide) to its own claims administrator.

Category B — UC "At Your Service" Call Records and Case Notes: Documentation of Harold's early 2015 calls, including what Harold told the representatives, what records they searched, what they found (or did not find), and what they reported internally. The documented record establishes that At Your Service "had no records reflecting Mr. Harold's worker's comp case or settlement agreement" — raising the question of how and when those records were removed from the system.

Category C — Ida Fong Internal Communications: Emails, reports, and case notes following the February 24 and March 18, 2021 calls, including any internal report of the erroneous disability coding of Harold's son Max, any investigation into Harold's claimed disability status, and any communication regarding Fong's admission that "old records were lost and not recovered."

Category D — Alexander Bustamante's Office Records: Internal acknowledgment, routing, and disposition of attorney Edgar Saenz’s November 9, 2021 audit request, including any communication regarding why the request has remained unanswered for over four years. As the Chief Compliance & Audit Officer, Bustamante’s office has specific obligations under the UC Internal Audit Charter, Regents Policy 7503, and UC Regents policy to respond to documented compliance concerns. The Saenz letter specifically requested: (1) an audit of Harold’s workers’ compensation and disability income case to determine his status; (2) an audit to determine what Personally Identifiable Information belonging to Harold was breached during UC data breaches; (3) an audit of Harold’s internal UC records within “At Your Service” to determine what records were lost during internal computer system upgrades; and (4) reversal of UC’s 2015 action that erroneously changed Harold’s disability income status to a service retirement and stopped paying for his medical insurance. UC’s failure to conduct the requested audit and respond to that formal request constitutes a breach of its fiduciary duties under UCRP, its obligations under California Government Code § 8546.7 and § 8547.7, and its own internal policies including the UC Internal Audit Charter.

Category E — UCPD Internal Communications: Lt. Chobanian's internal communications after receiving Harold's August 2023 emails identifying his case history and LA Times coverage, including any consultation with UC legal counsel or HR regarding Harold's CCW eligibility and the contradictions Harold raised between his settlement terms and the 2023 denial. Also, the "file" that Chobanian stated he conducted a "comprehensive review" of — what that file contained and where it came from, given UC's admitted record loss.

Category F — UCLA Luskin Center Research Files: The underlying research materials, source documents, and communications that led to the specific references to Harold's case in the published report, including any contact with UCLA Risk Management or university counsel regarding the statements attributed to those offices in the report.

Category G — Data Breach Impact Assessment Records: Internal UC and Anthem records relating to the impact of the 25 documented data breaches (2005–2026) on Harold’s specific employment, retirement, disability, and health insurance records, including: any assessment of whether Harold’s records were among those compromised, corrupted, or modified during any breach incident; any remediation or audit performed on affected records; internal communications regarding the relationship between data breaches and the admitted loss of records referenced by Ida Fong on March 18, 2021; and any correspondence between UC and Anthem/Blue Cross regarding the integrity of UC employee and retiree records following breach incidents. (See Chapter 05: 25 Data Breaches Exposed the Systems That Were Supposed to Protect Harold’s Records, providing the complete chronological breach archive.)

4. CONTINUING TORT — THE STATE ACTION THAT WAS NEVER SETTLED

Harold was a plaintiff in Harold v. The Regents of the University of California, a state tort action for discrimination, whistleblowing, acts against public policy, and related claims arising from his employment as a UCLA police officer and his role as founding president of the Federated University Police Officers’ Association. Coverage of this case appeared in the Los Angeles Times (February 25, 1993, and additional contemporaneous coverage). Harold’s case is also documented in UCLA’s institutional history archive, “History of Racism and the Quest for Racial Justice at UCLA” (Luskin Center).

During a period of unpaid medical leave, Harold was forced to file bankruptcy, which resulted in the bankruptcy court seizing his tort lawsuit as an asset. Harold received no money from the tort lawsuit and he never signed a settlement agreement in that case, leaving the case technically open for future claims of harassment. The current dispute regarding UC’s failure to honor Harold’s disability status and medical insurance entitlements constitutes a continuing tort arising from the same pattern of institutional conduct.

5. PROOF OF SYSTEMIC DISABILITY-CODING ERRORS IN UC SYSTEMS

A. Erroneous Disability Coding of Max Harold (Harold’s Son): On February 24, 2021, Ida Fong of UC Benefits called Harold regarding his son Max Harold’s health insurance coverage. According to Ms. Fong, Max was listed as “disabled” in UC’s system and she wanted to verify if this was still the case so she could extend his medical insurance coverage since Max was over 27 years old. Harold informed Ms. Fong that Max has never been disabled. Harold explained that he had a disability rating and “Disability Income” from the UCLA Police Department before it was converted to “Retirement Income.”

Applicable Federal Law — ACA Age 26 Rule (45 CFR § 147.120): Group health plans offering dependent coverage must provide that coverage until the child turns age 26. Coverage must end the month the child turns 26. There are no restrictions based on financial dependency, residency, marital status, student status, employment status, or eligibility for other coverage.

Applicable State Law — Disabled Dependent Exception (California Insurance Code § 10277): Coverage may continue for disabled children beyond age 26 only if: (1) the child is incapable of self-sustaining employment by reason of physically or mentally disabling injury, illness, or condition; and (2) the child is chiefly dependent upon the employee for support and maintenance. Medical certification is required, and insurers may request recertification annually.

Analysis: Max Harold was over age 27 at the time Ida Fong contacted Harold (February 2021). Under federal law (45 CFR § 147.120), group health plans are prohibited from covering dependents beyond age 26 unless the dependent qualifies as disabled under applicable state law. For Max to have remained enrolled in UC health coverage past age 26, UC’s system MUST have flagged him as disabled. Ida Fong confirmed that Max was NOT disabled — the coding was erroneous.

Conclusion — Proof of Data Corruption: This is direct documentary evidence that UC’s disability coding system was corrupted and unreliable during the relevant period (2014–2021). If UC’s system erroneously ADDED disability status to Max Harold (who was never disabled), it is equally probable that UC’s system erroneously REMOVED disability status from Harold (who had a documented permanent disability determination). This corroborates Ida Fong’s admission that “records were lost during computer system upgrades.”

B. UC Employee Admission of Record Loss: On March 18, 2021, Ida Fong called Harold again. She explained that when UC upgraded their computer systems several years ago, old records were lost and not recovered, so she could not look up any information about Harold’s original workers’ compensation case and disability status. Ms. Fong stated she had no computer records about Harold’s status because when UC installed a new computer system years ago, all records from the old system were lost. This admission by a UC employee confirms that UC’s systems experienced data loss or corruption during the period when Harold’s disability status was changed, his insurance premiums stopped being paid by UC, and his son was erroneously coded as disabled.

6. SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS DEMANDED FROM UC RASC

The following specific records were formally demanded from RASC in the Second Formal Request for Reconciliation dated January 31, 2026:

A. Status Classification History: Identify Harold’s UC benefit classification(s) by effective date (including Disability Income, Retirement Income, and any disability-retiree coding), and identify the authority and documentation relied upon for each classification.

B. Premium Responsibility Accounting: Provide a month-by-month accounting showing: (1) total medical premium amounts; (2) UC contribution amounts; (3) retiree share amounts; (4) method of collection (pension deduction vs. direct billing) — from the start of retiree medical deductions through the present.

C. Reconciliation With Permanent Disability Record: State whether UC currently recognizes the Octagon permanent disability determination in Harold’s benefits file. If not, identify what record UC relies upon instead and what documentation UC requires to correct or reconstruct the file.

D. Record Integrity / Reconstruction: If UC asserts that records are missing or unavailable, specify: (1) what systems were searched; (2) what date ranges are affected; (3) what retention or loss event is being relied upon; (4) what UC process applies to reconstructing eligibility determinations where records are incomplete.

E. Dependent Eligibility Coding (Max Harold): Confirm whether UC records previously reflected Harold’s son Max Harold as disabled for eligibility purposes, resulting in UC-sponsored medical coverage beyond age 26, and identify the documentation relied upon. This request is made solely to identify potential eligibility-coding inconsistencies relevant to Harold’s file and to demonstrate data field corruption.

F. Audit of All 1099s: Provide an audit of all 1099s issued by UC to Harold with an explanation as to why reported and taxable income changed from year to year, including the transition from tax-free Disability Income to taxable Retirement Income.

G. Audit of Personally Identifiable Information Breached: Conduct an audit to determine what Personally Identifiable Information belonging to Harold was breached during the UC and Anthem/Blue Cross data breaches documented between 2005 and 2026 (see Chapter 05: 25 Data Breaches Exposed the Systems That Were Supposed to Protect Harold’s Records).

Each of these seven categories, if the documents exist, would transform the reasonable inferences drawn in Issues I through V into proven facts. If the documents do not exist — if UC destroyed, lost, or failed to create records it was required to maintain — that failure is itself evidence of institutional negligence, and potentially of spoliation.

CONCLUSION:

The documented record establishes reasonable and probable cause to support discovery in each of the seven identified categories. The facts documented in this memorandum are sufficient to establish that questions exist that need answering. Subpoenas and formal audit processes are the mechanism to obtain those answers. Harold has exhausted all internal channels over a period of years, including multiple direct contacts with UC entities, a formal audit request from an attorney that has gone unanswered for over four years, and a second formal audit request dated January 31, 2026.

7. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR ACTION

This memorandum has presented six discrete legal issues, each analyzed under the IRAC method with reference to documented facts, applicable legal authorities, and UC's own policies. The purpose has not been to make accusations but to present the documented record and the application of law to facts so that the reader may form their own conclusions.

The documented record speaks for itself:

1. UCLA, through its Luskin Center for History and Policy, has published an official institutional document that names Harold, documents his lawsuits, and records the institutional response to his charges.

2. Seven UC entities, over a period of seventeen years (2009–2026), were directly informed of Harold's settlement terms and his claim that those terms were being violated. The documented response was dismissal, claimed ignorance, admitted record loss, or silence.

3. The Octagon Risk Services letter, together with UC's decade of performance, establishes contractual terms that UC unilaterally modified without consent, without WCAB approval, and in violation of POBR due process requirements, resulting in approximately $133,000 to $150,000 in quantifiable damages, plus additional tax liability, plus loss of CCW privileges.

4. The pattern of institutional conduct directed at a documented whistleblower whose identity and history are known to the institution raises questions that only UC can answer — and UC has declined to answer them for over four years.

5. UC maintains contradictory status classifications for Harold depending on which classification serves UC's institutional interest in a given context. (See Chapter 06: Schrödinger's Retiree — Ten Contradictions UC Cannot Reconcile.)

6. The documented record establishes reasonable and probable cause for discovery that would either confirm or resolve the issues raised herein.

7. Harold never signed a settlement agreement in the state tort action Harold v. The Regents of the University of California. The bankruptcy court seized the lawsuit as an asset during Harold’s forced bankruptcy. Harold received no money from the tort lawsuit. The case remains technically open for future claims of harassment, and the current dispute constitutes a continuing tort arising from the same pattern of institutional conduct.

8. UC’s own disability coding system was demonstrably corrupted during the relevant period (2014–2021). UC erroneously added disability status to Harold’s non-disabled son Max while simultaneously removing Harold’s documented permanent disability status. Under 45 CFR § 147.120 and California Insurance Code § 10277, Max could only have remained enrolled in UC health coverage past age 26 if UC’s system flagged him as disabled — a coding UC employee Ida Fong confirmed was erroneous. UC employee Ida Fong further admitted on March 18, 2021 that “records were lost during computer system upgrades,” confirming systemic data loss during the period Harold’s status was changed.

Harold respectfully requests that the University of California:

A. Respond in writing to the Second Formal Request for Reconciliation dated January 31, 2026, and the unanswered First Formal Request for Audit dated November 9, 2021;

B. Conduct the requested audit and reconciliation of Harold's permanent disability determination against his current benefits classification and premium deductions;

C. Provide a written determination addressing each of the contradictions identified in this memorandum;

D. Take no action that would alter, modify, or interrupt Harold’s current medical coverage during his scheduled cancer surgery in February 2026.

E. Place an immediate hold on any internal actions, quotes, or procedures that would modify, re-rate, terminate, or otherwise change Harold’s current Blue Cross Medicare coverage until this reconciliation and audit review are completed and resolved in writing;

F. Reverse the 2015 action that improperly changed Harold’s Disability Income status to Service Retirement Income and stopped paying for his medical insurance; and

G. Provide a full accounting of the medical insurance premiums that have been improperly deducted from Harold’s retirement income since 2015.

(See Chapter 14: Demand to Stop Medical Coverage Transfers, for the complete itemized demand with response deadline.)