EVIDENTIARY PACKAGE — CHAPTERS FILED AND PENDING

INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION THAT RESOLVES EVERYTHING

This analysis presents a single chain of documented facts and applicable law that resolves the central contradiction in the case of Charles A. Harold, Jr. (UCLA Police Department, Badge #341) versus the Regents of the University of California. The chain proceeds through seven steps. Each step follows from the prior step. Each step is supported by UC’s own records, UC’s own plan language, UC’s own sworn declarations, UC’s own federal tax filings, or published judicial opinions interpreting UC’s own rules.

The question is: When did Charles Harold stop being an employee of the University of California and become a separated retiree?

UC’s answer must be: “When he affirmatively elected to convert from Duty Disability Income to Retirement Income in 2015.”

The documented record shows: That election was obtained by a false statement that Harold would lose his income if he did not convert — a statement that was false under UC’s own plan at the time it was made. An election obtained through coercion and misrepresentation is not an affirmative election. If Harold never validly converted, he never validly separated from service. If he never validly separated, then every action UC has taken since June 2015 — the tax reclassification, the premium deductions, the cessation of service credit accrual, the CCW denial, the Via Benefits transfer attempt — was built on a void foundation.

And UC’s own federal tax filings prove it.

I. THE CODE 2 CERTIFICATION & WHAT IT REQUIRED UC TO TELL THE IRS

From 2003 through May 2015, the University of California reported Harold’s income to the Internal Revenue Service using IRS Distribution Code 3 (Disability) on Form 1099-R. This code signifies that the recipient is receiving disability income from a qualified plan. The income was 92.7% tax-free. No federal income tax was withheld.

In June 2015, UC changed Harold’s distribution code from Code 3 to Code 2 (Early distribution, exception applies). UC continued to report Code 2 from June 2015 through approximately July 2020.

IRS Distribution Code 2 has a specific, narrow meaning. Per the IRS Instructions for Forms 1099-R and 5498, the payer uses Code 2 “only if the participant has not reached age 59½ and you know the distribution is” one of a limited set of qualifying exceptions to the 10% early withdrawal penalty under Internal Revenue Code § 72(t).

The word “early” means early pension distribution. Not disability income. Not workers’ compensation. A distribution from a qualified retirement plan. Code 3 is disability. Code 2 is pension. By switching from Code 3 to Code 2, UC affirmatively changed Harold’s federal tax classification from disabled to separated and receiving a pension.

1. Harold’s Age at the Time of Conversion

Date of Birth: [DOB ON FILE WITH UC]. Date of Conversion: June 1, 2015. Age at Conversion: 54 years old. Age 59½ reached: approximately July 3, 2020.

Harold was under 59½ from June 2015 through July 2020. That is exactly the period UC used Code 2. The moment he turned 59½ in mid-2020, UC split the tax year again and changed him to Code 7 (“Normal distribution”). UC was tracking his age with precision.

2. The Only Ways to Qualify for Code 2

Under IRC § 72(t)(2), the exceptions that allow Code 2 for a distribution from a governmental defined benefit plan to a person under age 59½ are:

1. Separation from service after attaining age 55 — IRC § 72(t)(2)(A)(v). Harold was 54 in June 2015. He had not reached age 55. Does not apply.

2. For qualified public safety employees: separation from service after attaining age 50 — IRC § 72(t)(10). Harold was 54 and a former police officer. UCRP is a governmental defined benefit plan. This is the only exception that fits.

3. Substantially equal periodic payments (SEPP) — IRC § 72(t)(2)(A)(iv). Possible but typically coded differently and would not require the public safety employee determination.

4. Disability — IRC § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii). That would be Code 3, not Code 2. Code 3 is what Harold already had. UC specifically changed him away from the disability code.

5. IRS levy — IRC § 72(t)(2)(A)(vii). No IRS levy occurred. Does not apply.

II. IRC § 72(t)(10) — UC CERTIFIED HAROLD AS A “QUALIFIED PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE”

IRC § 72(t)(10), enacted by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, substitutes age 50 for age 55 for “qualified public safety employees” who receive distributions from a governmental defined benefit plan after separation from service.

IRC § 72(t)(10)(B)(i) defines “qualified public safety employee” as: “any employee of a State or political subdivision of a State who provides police protection, firefighting services, or emergency medical services for any area within the jurisdiction of such State or political subdivision.”

By placing Code 2 in Box 7 of Harold’s 1099-R forms from June 2015 through mid-2020, the Regents of the University of California, UC Retirement System (Federal ID 94-2557406, 300 Lakeside Drive, 5th Floor, Oakland, CA 94612-3555; later 1111 Franklin Street, Oakland, CA 94607-5201) certified to the Internal Revenue Service the following facts:

Certification 1: The distribution is from a qualified retirement plan — not disability income.

Implication: UC acknowledged that as of June 2015, Harold was no longer receiving disability income. UC affirmatively reclassified him from disabled (Code 3) to pensioner (Code 2). This reclassification required UC to determine that Harold's status had changed from Disabled Member to Retired Member under the UCRP.

Contradiction: Under UCRP § 8.18(a), that status change can only occur when a Disabled Member "elects to retire." The Jacobs court confirmed: DDI recipients "can elect to retire when eligible, but are never required to do so." UC's own lead disability benefits analyst stated under oath: "A person may convert to Retirement only by making an affirmative election to do so." The documented record shows Harold was told he must convert or lose his income — not that he was electing voluntarily. UC certified a status change to the IRS that, under UC's own plan language, required an affirmative election that the documented record indicates was not freely given.

Certification 2: The participant has separated from service.

Implication: UC certified under penalty of perjury that Harold separated from service as of June 2015. Both the age-55 exception under § 72(t)(2)(A)(v) and the public safety age-50 exception under § 72(t)(10) require that the distribution be made "after separation from service." Without a valid separation, Code 2 cannot be used.

Contradiction: On August 25, 2023, Captain Jeff Chobanian (Badge #307, UCLA Police Department) classified Harold as "medically separated on March 1, 1996" — not separated via retirement in 2015. On February 10, 2026, Chobanian confirmed: "the decision to decline your request for a CCW is final" and stated he had "cross-referenced the records, including your date of separation, classification, status, and our internal records." UC's internal records reflect a 1996 medical separation — not a 2015 retirement separation. The "separation from service" UC certified to the IRS in 2015 does not match the separation date, type, or classification in UC's own internal systems as reviewed by Chobanian in 2023 and 2026.

Certification 3: The participant qualifies for a known exception to the 10% penalty.

Implication: The IRS instructions require that Code 2 be used "only if" the payer "knows" the distribution qualifies for a specific exception. UC did not check "taxable amount not determined" in Box 2b. UC affirmatively stated it knew which exception applied and that Harold qualified. This means someone at UC Retirement System made a determination — identified the applicable exception, verified Harold's eligibility, and authorized the code change.

Contradiction: No documentation has been produced showing who at UC made this determination, when it was made, what exception was identified, or what records were reviewed. Harold was not notified of the basis for his qualification. Harold was not provided the opportunity to accept or reject this reclassification. On March 18, 2021, UC employee Ida Fong admitted that when UC upgraded their computer systems, old records were lost and not recovered, and she could not look up any information about Harold's original workers' compensation case or disability status. On November 9, 2021, Attorney Edgar Saenz formally requested that UC audit Harold's records. As of February 17, 2026, UC has never responded. UC certified to the IRS that it "knew" Harold qualified for an exception, but UC cannot produce the records showing how that determination was made.

Certification 4: If the public safety exception was the basis — UC certified Harold was a qualified public safety employee who separated from service after attaining age 50.

Implication: By invoking IRC § 72(t)(10), UC acknowledged that Harold is a "qualified public safety employee" — defined by § 72(t)(10)(B)(i) as "any employee of a State or political subdivision of a State who provides police protection." This is an explicit federal certification of Harold's law enforcement status. UC used this status to classify Harold's income as an early pension distribution, resulting in 100% taxability — the outcome least favorable to Harold.

Contradiction: When Harold sought to exercise the rights that flow from the identical status — qualified retired law enforcement officer under 18 U.S.C. § 926C (LEOSA) — UC denied him. Captain Chobanian stated Harold was "medically separated, not retired" and ineligible for a retiree CCW. UC certified to the IRS that Harold is a public safety employee who separated from service and is receiving a pension (for tax purposes). UC told Harold he is not a retired law enforcement officer and is not receiving retirement benefits (for CCW purposes). The same institution applied the same person's public safety status to produce opposite outcomes — both unfavorable to Harold.

These certifications were made under penalty of perjury. 26 U.S.C. § 7206 makes it a felony to willfully deliver or disclose any return, statement, or other document known to be fraudulent or false as to any material matter. UC made these certifications to the IRS every year from 2015 through 2024. The IRS accepted these filings. No correction was issued. No audit was triggered.

1. The § 402(l) Exclusion UC Never Disclosed

The Pension Protection Act of 2006 — the same law that created IRC § 72(t)(10) — also created IRC § 402(l), which permits eligible retired public safety officers to exclude up to $3,000 per year from taxable income if retirement plan distributions are used to pay for health insurance premiums (for the retiree, spouse, or dependents). The premiums must be deducted directly from the plan distribution by the plan administrator and remitted to the insurance provider.

UC is deducting Harold’s health insurance premiums ($727.48/month as of 2026) directly from his UCRP pension distribution. Under § 402(l), if Harold qualifies as a retired public safety officer — which UC already certified by using Code 2 under § 72(t)(10) — he should have been receiving a $3,000 annual tax exclusion for those premium deductions since 2015. That is potentially $3,000 × 10 years = $30,000 in additional tax benefits Harold was never informed about and never received.

III. THE LEOSA BRIDGE — SAME FEDERAL STATUTES, OPPOSITE OUTCOMES

Two federal statutes define essentially the same status. UC used one to Harold’s detriment while denying the other.

1. The IRS Definition: IRC § 72(t)(10)(B)(i)

“Qualified public safety employee” means “any employee of a State or political subdivision of a State who provides police protection, firefighting services, or emergency medical services for any area within the jurisdiction of such State or political subdivision.”

2. The LEOSA Definition: 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(1)

“Qualified retired law enforcement officer” means an individual who “separated from service in good standing from service with a public agency as a law enforcement officer.”

The overlap is total. A person who “provides police protection” under the IRS code is a “law enforcement officer” under LEOSA. UC cannot certify to the IRS that Harold is a qualified public safety employee who provides police protection AND simultaneously deny through Captain Jeff Chobanian (Badge #307, UCLA Police Department) that he qualifies as a retired law enforcement officer for CCW purposes. They are the same status, described by two different federal statutes.

3. The Aggregate Service Calculation

UC’s Code 2 filing under IRC § 72(t)(10) certifies Harold as a “qualified public safety employee.” The statute does not say “employee who provides police protection for THIS particular agency.” It says “any employee of a State or political subdivision of a State who provides police protection.”

Harold provided police protection for three political subdivisions of the State of California:

LEOSA, at 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(3)(A), requires service “for an aggregate of 10 years or more.” The word is “aggregate” — not “contiguous,” not “consecutive,” not “with a single agency.” Congress chose this word deliberately. The 2010 amendment (Pub. L. 111-272) changed the threshold from 15 years to 10 and simultaneously changed “regularly employed” to “served as” — broadening the definition to include aggregate service across agencies. The approximately one-year gap between Culver City PD and UCLA PD is legally irrelevant.

Additionally, UC's own "At Your Service" retirement system calculated Harold's service credit at 21 years (including UCRP § 8.18(e) disability accrual). In 2013, the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) issued Harold a Requalification Certificate through Napa Valley College CJTC, certifying him as qualified to work as a police officer — he was pursuing a District Attorney investigator position that would not interfere with his injuries. California itself, through its POST certification system, recognized Harold's continuing status as a qualified peace officer.

Implication: LEOSA requires service "for an aggregate of 10 years or more." The word "aggregate" — not "contiguous," not "consecutive," not "with a single agency" — was chosen deliberately by Congress. The 2010 amendment (Pub. L. 111-272) simultaneously reduced the threshold from 15 to 10 years and changed "regularly employed" to "served as," broadening the definition to encompass aggregate service across agencies. Harold provided police protection for three political subdivisions of the State of California totaling approximately 11–13 years. All three agencies are political subdivisions of the State of California. Harold held POST certification that carried across agencies. UC's own "At Your Service" retirement system calculated 21 years of service credit.

Contradiction: Captain Chobanian's August 25, 2023 denial was based on Harold having "fewer than ten years" of service. On February 10, 2026, Chobanian confirmed he had "cross-referenced the records, including your date of separation, classification, status, and our internal records." Chobanian counted only UCLA PD service — approximately 6 years from December 1989 to March 1, 1996 — and did not apply the federal "aggregate" standard that Congress enacted and that the statute requires. Chobanian applied a single-agency calculation to a federal statute that requires an aggregate calculation. UC's own tax department applied the aggregate public safety employee standard when it certified Harold under IRC § 72(t)(10) to the IRS, but UC's own police department refused to apply the identical aggregate standard when Harold sought to exercise the rights that flow from the same status.

4. The Disability Exception Makes the Service Years Irrelevant

Even setting aside the aggregate years, LEOSA provides a second, independent qualification path. 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(3) uses the word “or”:

(A) before such separation, served as a law enforcement officer for an aggregate of 10 years or more; or

(B) separated from service with such agency, after completing any applicable probationary period of such service, due to a service-connected disability, as determined by such agency.

Captain Jeff Chobanian’s own August 25, 2023 letter classified Harold as: “Your status was designated as medically separated on March 1, 1996.”

Harold’s on-duty injury occurred on February 16, 1996. Octagon Risk Services (a St. Paul member company, P.O. Box 956914, Los Angeles, CA 90095-6914) confirmed on August 8, 2001 that Harold sustained a permanent disability of 6¾% under Workers’ Compensation Claim #199650445, with a Qualified Medical Evaluator report from Dr. Steven Silbart dated December 27, 1999, establishing a permanent and stationary date of July 21, 1997. Harold’s workers’ compensation attorney was Dennis Hargrove of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (1912 I Street, Suite 102, Sacramento, CA 95814).

Chobanian's classification of Harold as "medically separated" due to an on-duty injury is the very status that triggers the disability exception under § 926C(c)(3)(B). Subsection (B) requires zero years of service. The disability alone qualifies. Chobanian's own classification of Harold proves Harold's eligibility under the very federal law Chobanian cited to deny him.

Implication: LEOSA § 926C(c)(3)(B) requires that the individual "separated from service with such agency, after completing any applicable probationary period of such service, due to a service-connected disability, as determined by such agency." Chobanian, acting for UCLA PD ("such agency"), personally determined that Harold separated on March 1, 1996 ("separated from service"), after completing approximately 6+ years of service ("after completing any applicable probationary period"), due to his February 16, 1996 on-duty injury ("due to a service-connected disability"), and Chobanian personally made this determination ("as determined by such agency"). Every element of § 926C(c)(3)(B) is satisfied by Chobanian's own findings.

Contradiction: Chobanian used Harold's disability classification as the basis for denial ("medically separated, not retired") when that identical classification — separation due to a service-connected disability, as determined by such agency — is the qualifying event under subsection (B). The determination that Chobanian used to deny is the determination that the federal statute requires to qualify. Additionally, Harold's 2013 CCW was reissued by UCLA PD on August 29, 2013 — eleven months after the Alberts v. Regents trial court decision of September 24, 2012, which UC has cited as the basis for discontinuing CCWs to DDI recipients. Two different Chiefs of Police, over an eleven-year period (September 6, 2002 and August 29, 2013), reviewed Harold's file and determined he was eligible. Furthermore, UCLA PD Policy 1700.1, dated August 18, 2020, was applied retroactively to eliminate eligibility established by those two prior issuances without notice, without hearing, and without any opportunity to be heard. Gold Book Policy 1700.5 provides appeal rights under Penal Code §§ 26310 and 26320, including a three-member hearing board. No appeal rights were offered. No written notice was sent by first class mail. No 15-day hearing period was provided. No hearing board was convened.

Two Federal Statutes, One UC System, Opposite Results

UC used Harold’s public safety status to justify taxing his income as an early pension distribution under IRC § 72(t)(10). UC denied Harold’s public safety status when he sought to exercise his rights as a retired law enforcement officer under LEOSA. Same person. Same career. Same federal government. Opposite outcomes. Both unfavorable to Harold.

IV. THE JACOBS FRAMEWORK – EMPLOYEE v. SEPARATED UNDER UCRP

In Allison Jacobs et al. v. The Regents of the University of California (2017) B268758, Second Appellate District, Division Two (Los Angeles County Superior Court No. BS147764), the Court of Appeal interpreted the University of California Retirement Plan (UCRP) and established the following holdings:

Holding 1: "Duty Disabled Members are not required to be separated from employment before receiving DDI." (Jacobs, citing UCRP § 5.05.)

Holding 2: "By contrast, the effective date of Retirement Income cannot precede separation from University service." (UCRP § 5.05 ["providing that the effective date of Retirement Income for eligible Members cannot be earlier than the day following separation from University service or the first day of the month in which the application is received by the plan administrator, whichever is later"].)

Holding 3: "Under the UCRP, Disabled Members receiving DDI: (1) are not retired; (2) do not receive Retirement Income; and (3) can elect to retire when eligible, but are never required to do so."

Holding 4: DDI recipients "continue to receive and accrue service credit while receiving DDI and while no longer an employee." (UCRP § 8.18(e).)

Holding 5: The Regents' own lead disability benefits analyst for the University of California system stated under oath in the Jacobs proceeding: "[A] person may convert to Retirement only by making an affirmative election to do so."

A. Application of the Jacobs Holdings to Harold's Conversion

The phrase "are never required to do so" in Holding 3 is absolute. Not "are generally not required." Not "are not required except under certain circumstances." The Court of Appeal used the word "never." This means no UC employee, no adjusting company, no third-party administrator has the authority to require a DDI recipient to convert. The only path is the member's own voluntary election.

In approximately 2014–2015, a UC adjusting company told Harold he must convert or lose his income. The Saenz letter (November 9, 2021) documented: Harold "filed the required paperwork for 'Retirement Income' feeling he had no choice. It was to convert to 'Retirement Income' or lose his benefits entirely." The adjuster's statement that Harold must convert is irreconcilable with the Court of Appeal's holding that DDI recipients "are never required to do so." The Regents' own lead disability benefits analyst confirmed under oath in the Jacobs proceeding: "A person may convert to Retirement only by making an affirmative election to do so." An election made under threat of losing one's income is not an affirmative election. It is compliance with a demand that the plan itself and the Court of Appeal both say cannot be made.

B. The Separation Requirement — Why Code 2 Cannot Exist Without a Valid Election

For UC to begin paying Harold Retirement Income (Code 2) effective June 1, 2015, Harold must have separated from University service on or before that date (Holding 2). This separation is a prerequisite — not optional, not administrative. The plan requires it.

UC's Code 2 filing certifies to the IRS that Harold had separated from service. But Holding 1 says DDI recipients are "not required to be separated from employment." If Harold was a DDI recipient who had not separated (per Holding 1), and Retirement Income "cannot precede separation" (per Holding 2), then UC could not begin paying Retirement Income until Harold first separated — and the only mechanism for that separation was an "affirmative election" to convert (per Holding 5). If the election was coerced, no valid separation occurred. If no valid separation occurred, Retirement Income could not have a valid effective date under § 5.05. If Retirement Income has no valid effective date, Code 2 was applied to a distribution that the plan itself says cannot exist.

3. The Two Mutually Exclusive States Under the UCRP

There is no third category. There is no "medically separated but not retired but also not disabled." The UCRP, as the Jacobs court read it, has two and only two states for a person in Harold's situation: Disabled Member or Retired Member. The transition between them requires one and only one thing: an affirmative election by the member.

D. What DDI Recipients Give Up Upon Conversion

The Jacobs court specifically identified the financial advantages of DDI over Retirement Income:

The Jacobs court also held that DDI “can be collected for life” without ceasing upon reaching retirement eligibility age, and that DDI is “exempt from income tax for the entire time it is received.”

V. THE INVALID ELECTION – COERCION THROUGH FALSE STATEMENTS

1. The Precursor: The Thomas Herz SSA Pressure Campaign (2009–2010)

The coercion did not begin in 2014. It began at least five years earlier. Between September 2009 and June 2010, Thomas Herz of UCOP Health & Welfare Administration repeatedly demanded that Harold apply for Social Security disability benefits (SSDI). The documented sequence is as follows:

September 29, 2009: Herz initiated contact regarding Harold’s SSA determination status. (Document: 20090929_Thomas_Herz_re_SSA_determination.)

January 10, 2010: Herz demanded documentation regarding compliance with UC’s requirement that disability recipients apply for SSA benefits. (Document: 20100110_Thomas_Herz_Yahoo_Mail_Re_documents_for_compliance.)

March 8, 2010: Herz forwarded documentation demands. (Document: 20100308_Thomas_Herz_re_SSA_Yahoo_Mail_Fw_document.)

March 29, 2010: Herz warned that “UC needs a determination of whether or not a person is eligible for SS disability benefits as that affects Medicare eligibility” and that “Without such documentation, you remain out of compliance and jeopardize your UC medical benefits.” The institutional significance: if Harold had been found eligible for SSDI, he would have become Medicare-eligible after 24 months, and Medicare would have become the primary payer — shifting medical costs off UC’s books.

April 6, 2010: Herz escalated the threat: “Failure to provide this determination, either in the affirmative or negative, can result in an offset fee being imposed on your check and termination of UC medical coverage.” Herz set a May 2010 deadline. (Document: 20100406_Thomas_Herz_SSA_application_Yahoo_Mail_Re_documentation.)

April 9, 2010: Harold complied. At 11:27 AM, Harold wrote to Herz: “I tried to apply for benefits as it stated on the form but it would not let me because it said I need to be 61 years or older.” Later that same day, at 12:51 PM, after physically visiting a Social Security office, Harold wrote: “It turns out I am not crazy. I am in the SS office and the guy tells me I was blocked from proceeding because I did not meet the criteria.” The Social Security Administration confirmed Harold was ineligible for SSDI because he did not meet the criteria.

June 8, 2010: Harold reported to Herz that the SSA representative said that since he earned more than $12,000 per year, he was automatically ineligible for SSA disability benefits. (Document: 20100608_Thomas_Herz_Yahoo_Mail_Re_SSA_letter.)

When the SSA avenue failed to shift Harold’s medical costs off UC’s books, the pattern escalated. Approximately four years later, the adjusting company took the more aggressive approach.

2. The 2014–2015 Coerced Conversion

In approximately 2014–2015, a third-party adjusting company (Gates/Gallagher, successor to Octagon Risk Services) contacted Harold and demanded a medical re-examination of his permanent disability. The adjusting company claimed no knowledge of the 2003 workers’ compensation settlement agreement. When Harold could not produce the settlement records — because UC could not find them either — the adjuster stated that Harold must convert from Duty Disability Income to Retirement Income or he would lose his income entirely.

Attorney Edgar Saenz of Saenz Clinco Fisher Diamond & Trope documented this in his November 9, 2021 letter to Alexander Bustamante, Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance & Audit Officer, University of California: Harold “filed the required paperwork for ‘Retirement Income’ feeling he had no choice. It was to convert to ‘Retirement Income’ or lose his benefits entirely.”

That statement — that Harold must convert or lose his income — was false under UC’s own plan at the time it was made.

3. The Plan Language That Was Already in Effect

UCRP § 8.18(a) provides that Duty Disability Income “continue[s] until such time as the Member is no longer disabled as defined or elects to retire.” The operative word is “elects.” Not “is required to.” Not “must.” Not “shall.” Elects.

The Jacobs court confirmed this reading, holding that DDI recipients “can elect to retire when eligible, but are never required to do so.” (Jacobs, at p. 10.) The Regents’ own lead disability benefits analyst stated under oath in the Jacobs proceeding: “[A] person may convert to Retirement only by making an affirmative election to do so.”

This was not new law created by the Jacobs opinion in 2017. The court was reading UCRP § 8.18(a) — plan language that was in effect throughout 2014 and 2015 when the adjuster made the threat. The word “elects” has been in the UCRP since its adoption.

4. Why No Rational Person Would Voluntarily Elect This Conversion

No rational person receiving approximately $3,111/month tax-free (January–May 2015 rate, per IRS Form 1099-R, Distribution Code 3) with $0 in insurance premium deductions and continuing service credit accrual under UCRP § 8.18(e) would voluntarily elect to receive approximately $2,088/month fully taxable (June–December 2015 rate, per IRS Form 1099-R, Distribution Code 2) with over $1,000/month in insurance premium deductions and no further service credit accrual.

The financial harm from the conversion, documented by 15 years of IRS Forms 1099-R (2010–2024), is as follows:

Conservative estimate of premium deductions (June 2015–2024): $65,349.04

Higher estimate using actual pre-conversion rate as baseline: $102,055.80

Additional taxable income created by reclassification from Code 3 to Code 2/7 (2015–2024): $269,957.36

Estimated excess federal income taxes at conservative 12% marginal rate: $32,394.88

Estimated excess federal income taxes at 22% marginal rate: $59,390.62

Documented federal income tax actually withheld (per 1099-R Box 4): $2,018.05 ($230.43 in 2015 + $706.09 in 2016 + $798.88 in 2017 + $282.65 in 2018)

These calculations do not include lost DDI service credit accrual under UCRP § 8.18(e), which would add additional damages requiring actuarial calculation, or the § 402(l) tax exclusion described in Section 2 above.

5. The Legal Standard: Consent Obtained Through Coercion Is Voidable

Under California law, consent must be free to be valid. California Civil Code § 1567 provides that consent is not free when obtained through duress, menace, fraud, undue influence, or mistake. California Civil Code § 1689(b)(1) provides that a party may rescind a contract if consent was obtained through duress or fraud.

An election obtained by threatening to terminate benefits that the plan itself guaranteed — when the plan language states those benefits “continue” until the member “elects” to retire, and the plan administrator’s own sworn declaration confirms that conversion requires an “affirmative election” — is not an affirmative election. It is coercion through misrepresentation of the plan’s own terms.

VI. THE PIVOT POINT – WHEN DID HAROLD STOP BEING A UC EMPLOYEE?

From 2003 to June 2015, Harold was a Disabled Member receiving DDI under UCRP § 8.18(a). Under the Jacobs holdings, he was:

— NOT retired (Holding 3)

— NOT separated from service (Holding 1)

— Still accruing service credit under UCRP § 8.18(e) (Holding 4)

— Still technically connected to UCLA PD (DDI paid from department budget)

— Receiving tax-free income (Code 3)

This is, as Harold stated in his own words, more like an employee than a retiree. He was being paid. He was accruing service credit. He was not separated. The only difference between him and an active officer was that he was not performing duties due to his disability.

1. The Conversion Moment Required Two Things

Requirement 1: An affirmative election. “A person may convert to Retirement only by making an affirmative election to do so.” (Regents’ own analyst, under oath in Jacobs.)

Requirement 2: A separation from University service. “The effective date of Retirement Income cannot precede separation from University service.” (UCRP § 5.05.)

The election was not voluntary. Harold was told he would lose his benefits if he did not convert. That statement was false under UCRP § 8.18(a). The Saenz letter documented: Harold “filed the required paperwork for ‘Retirement Income’ feeling he had no choice.”

If the election is invalid, then Harold never validly converted. If Harold never validly converted, then he never validly separated from service.

B. The Undisclosed Gap: 1996–2001 — UC Classified Harold as Disabled but Paid Him Nothing

On August 25, 2023, Captain Jeff Chobanian (Badge #307, UCLA Police Department) stated that Harold's "status was designated as medically separated on March 1, 1996." On February 10, 2026, Chobanian confirmed he had "cross-referenced the records, including your date of separation, classification, status, and our internal records." UC has therefore established, through its own authorized representative reviewing its own internal records, that Harold became a Disabled Member as of March 1, 1996.

Under UCRP § 8.18(a), Duty Disability Income "continue[s] until such time as the Member is no longer disabled as defined or elects to retire." The Jacobs court confirmed that DDI recipients "can elect to retire when eligible, but are never required to do so." (Holding 3.) The Jacobs court further confirmed that DDI recipients "continue to receive and accrue service credit while receiving DDI." (Holding 4, citing UCRP § 8.18(e).)

If Harold's Disabled Member status began on March 1, 1996, as UC's own records reflect, then UC's obligation to pay DDI also began on or about that date — or, at the latest, on July 21, 1997, when Dr. Steven Silbart's Qualified Medical Evaluator report established that Harold's industrial injury of February 16, 1996 had become permanent and stationary, resulting in a permanent disability rating of 6¾%, as confirmed in the Octagon Risk Services letter of August 8, 2001.

However, the documented record reflects three separate delays within the disability determination and payment process itself:

1. First, Dr. Silbart's report establishing a permanent and stationary date of July 21, 1997 was not completed until December 27, 1999 — approximately 29 months after the medical determination date. The reason for this delay is not documented in any record available to Harold.

2. Second, Octagon Risk Services, acting as UC's own claims administrator, did not issue the "NOTICE REGARDING START & END OF PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS" until August 8, 2001 — approximately 20 months after Dr. Silbart's report was completed and approximately 49 months after the permanent and stationary date. The reason for this delay is not documented in any record available to Harold.

3. Third, following the Octagon notification, Harold received approximately 85% of the calculated DDI amount pending final settlement of the workers' compensation case (Claim #199650445). The case did not settle until March 2003. Full DDI payments of approximately $3,075.98 per month tax-free did not begin until after that settlement.

The total elapsed time between UC's own classification date (March 1, 1996) and the commencement of full DDI payments (approximately March 2003) is approximately 84 months — seven years.

The record reflects that Harold received no payments of any kind from the University of California between approximately March 1996 and approximately 2001. During this period:

Harold was compelled to seek outside employment. In March 1996 — the same month UC classified him as medically separated — Harold obtained employment at Fox Broadcasting. He subsequently obtained employment at The Walt Disney Company in approximately December 2002. Harold worked at these positions not by choice but because UC, despite classifying him as medically separated, was not paying him Duty Disability Income or any other form of compensation.

At various times during this period, the UC record in Harold’s file should reflect that Harold’s attorney made attempts to place Harold back to work.

Harold filed for bankruptcy in approximately 1996–1997 — within months of UC's own medical separation date of March 1, 1996. The bankruptcy case is documented in the federal PACER system. A UCLA police officer who was injured on duty on February 16, 1996, classified by UC as medically separated on March 1, 1996, and entitled to Duty Disability Income under UCRP § 8.18(a), was forced into federal bankruptcy proceedings because the University of California was not making the disability payments its own retirement plan required. UC did not issue the first documented notification of permanent disability benefits (the Octagon Risk Services letter) until August 8, 2001 — more than four years after Harold filed for bankruptcy.

Harold received no IRS Form 1099-R, no IRS Form W-2, and no other tax documentation from the University of California reflecting any payment during the gap period — because no payments were made.

Using the documented DDI rate of $3,075.98 per month, the gap between the permanent and stationary date (July 21, 1997) and the earliest documented payment notification (August 8, 2001) represents approximately 49 months of unpaid DDI — approximately $150,723.02 tax-free. If calculated from Chobanian's medical separation date (March 1, 1996) through the Octagon notification (August 8, 2001), the gap is approximately 65 months — approximately $199,938.70 tax-free. If calculated from Chobanian's medical separation date through the March 2003 settlement, the gap is approximately 84 months — approximately $258,382.32 tax-free. These figures do not include interest, cost-of-living adjustments, consequential damages from Harold's bankruptcy, or lost service credit accrual under UCRP § 8.18(e) during the gap period.

The precise amount owed is a matter for UC to establish through its own records. Harold is not required to reconstruct UC's payroll history. UC, as plan administrator, is required to produce it.

Questions UC Must Answer Under Its Recordkeeping Obligations as Plan Administrator

The University of California, as plan administrator of the UCRP and as Harold's employer of record from December 1989 through the present (under whichever classification UC asserts applies), is required under federal and state law to maintain complete payroll, tax, and benefits records. The following questions require documented answers supported by records UC is obligated to maintain:

1. UC is requested to produce complete payroll records for Charles A. Harold Jr. (Badge #341, UCLA Police Department) from his date of hire in December 1989 through his last payroll-funded payment, including all regular pay, overtime, sick leave, disability pay, and any other compensation paid through the UCLA Police Department budget.

2. UC is requested to produce all IRS Forms W-2 issued to Charles A. Harold Jr. for every tax year from 1989 through the year in which W-2 reporting ceased, reflecting wages, withholdings, and employer contributions.

3. UC is requested to produce all IRS Forms 1099-R issued to Charles A. Harold Jr. for every tax year from the first distribution year through 2025, reflecting distribution amounts, taxable amounts, distribution codes (Box 7), and federal income tax withheld (Box 4).

4. UC is requested to identify the exact date on which the first Duty Disability Income payment was made to Harold, the amount of that payment, and the UCRP provision or administrative determination under which that payment was authorized.

5. UC is requested to explain why, if Harold's Disabled Member status began on March 1, 1996 (as Captain Chobanian's records review reflects), DDI payments did not begin until approximately 2001 — a gap of approximately five years.

6. UC is requested to identify whether any back-payment, retroactive payment, or lump-sum reconciliation was made to Harold for the period between March 1, 1996 (or July 21, 1997, the permanent and stationary date) and the date of the first DDI payment. If such a payment was made, UC is requested to produce the documentation. If no such payment was made, UC is requested to explain under what provision of the UCRP or California law Harold was denied benefits for a period during which UC's own records classified him as a Disabled Member.

7. UC is requested to produce all IRS Forms 1095-B issued to Charles A. Harold Jr. for every tax year from the first year of UC-sponsored health coverage through 2025, reflecting periods of minimum essential coverage and the identity of the coverage provider.

8. UC is requested to identify the exact date on which UC-sponsored health insurance coverage began for Harold following his medical separation, and to produce enrollment records reflecting the type of coverage, the premium amount (if any) deducted from Harold's payments, and the identity of the insurer for each year from 1996 through 2025.

9. UC is requested to produce Harold's complete service credit accrual record under UCRP § 8.18(e), showing the number of service credit years accrued during active duty (December 1989 – March 1, 1996), the number accrued during the DDI period (from the DDI start date through June 1, 2015), and the total reflected in UC's system as of the 2015 conversion date. UC's own "At Your Service" Retirement Estimator, accessed by Harold on April 2, 2015, reflected 21 years of service credit. UC is requested to produce the underlying records supporting that calculation.

10. UC is requested to produce all correspondence, internal memoranda, case notes, and administrative determinations related to Harold's workers' compensation claim (Claim #199650445) from the date of injury (February 16, 1996) through the settlement date (March 2003), including but not limited to all communications between UC, Octagon Risk Services, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Harold's attorney Dennis Hargrove of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi, and any successor claims administrator.

11. UC is requested to produce the complete file that Captain Jeff Chobanian stated he reviewed and "cross-referenced" in August 2023 and February 2026, including the specific documents reflecting Harold's "date of separation, classification, status," and all other records Chobanian relied upon in making his determinations.

12. UC is requested to identify every IRS Distribution Code applied to Harold's payments from the first payment through the present, the date on which each code change occurred, the name and title of the person who authorized each change, and the UCRP provision or IRS regulation under which each change was made.

13. UC is requested to explain the discrepancy between the Retirement Estimator projection of $2,341.04 per month (April 2, 2015) and Harold's actual post-conversion payment of approximately $1,300 per month. UC is requested to produce all records showing what amounts were deducted from Harold's gross distribution and for what purposes, for every month from June 2015 through the present.

14. If UC is unable to produce any of the foregoing records, UC is requested to state, for each category of records not produced: (a) the last known date on which the records existed in UC's systems; (b) the date on which UC became aware the records were no longer available; (c) the cause of the records' unavailability, including whether the loss is related to the system upgrades referenced by UC employee Ida Fong on March 18, 2021; and (d) what steps, if any, UC took to reconstruct or recover the missing records.

15. UC is requested to explain why the Qualified Medical Evaluator report establishing a permanent and stationary date of July 21, 1997 was not completed until December 27, 1999 — approximately 29 months after the medical determination date. UC is requested to produce all records reflecting who retained Dr. Steven Silbart, when the examination was conducted, when the report was requested, and why the report was not completed for over two years after the findings it documents.

16. UC is requested to explain why Octagon Risk Services, acting as UC's own claims administrator, did not issue the "NOTICE REGARDING START & END OF PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS" until August 8, 2001 — approximately 20 months after Dr. Silbart's report was completed on December 27, 1999, and approximately 49 months after the permanent and stationary date of July 21, 1997. UC is requested to produce all internal communications between UC and Octagon Risk Services regarding Harold's claim during this period, including any explanation for the delay.

17. UC is requested to identify whether Harold received any DDI or interim disability payments between March 1, 1996 (medical separation date) and August 8, 2001 (Octagon notification letter). If payments were made, UC is requested to produce payment records, check numbers, and deposit confirmations. If no payments were made during this period, UC is requested to identify under what provision of the UCRP or California Labor Code a Disabled Member classified as medically separated may be denied all income for a period exceeding five years while the plan administrator processes the disability determination.

18. UC is requested to state whether it was aware that Harold filed for bankruptcy in approximately 1996–1997 during the period in which UC classified him as a Disabled Member but was not paying Duty Disability Income. UC is requested to produce any notification it received regarding Harold's bankruptcy filing, including any proof of claim filed by UC in the bankruptcy proceeding, any communication between UC and the bankruptcy court or trustee, and any internal assessment of whether UC's non-payment of DDI contributed to Harold's financial insolvency. If UC was not aware of the bankruptcy, UC is requested to explain what monitoring or communication, if any, it maintained with a Disabled Member receiving zero income from the plan during a period of more than five years.

The absence of records does not extinguish the obligation. If UC cannot produce the records necessary to establish that Harold was properly paid from the date of his Disabled Member classification through the present, the inference under California Evidence Code § 412 (If weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger evidence.) and § 413 (willful suppression of evidence) is that the missing records would be unfavorable to UC's position.

These requests are made in conjunction with the formal audit demands set forth in Chapter 00 (Introduction), the Second Formal Audit Request dated January 31, 2026, and attorney Edgar Saenz's original audit request dated November 9, 2021, which has remained unanswered for over four years and three months.

3. Additional Evidence of Systemic Record Corruption During the Relevant Period

February 24, 2021: UC employee Ida Fong of UC Benefits contacted Harold and disclosed that his son Max was erroneously listed as “disabled” in UC’s system. Max has never been disabled. Harold’s permanent disability coding had been removed from UC’s records while a disability coding was erroneously applied to his non-disabled son — direct evidence of systemic data corruption in UC’s disability classification system during the relevant period.

March 18, 2021: Ida Fong contacted Harold a second time and admitted that when UC upgraded their computer systems several years ago, old records were lost and not recovered, and she could not look up any information about Harold’s original workers’ compensation case or disability status. (Document: IDA_Fong_Statement_of_Facts_UCLA_Data_Breach.)

November 9, 2021: Attorney Edgar Saenz submitted a formal audit request to Alexander Bustamante, Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance & Audit Officer, University of California, by certified mail and email to [email protected] (confirmed delivery, Gmail timestamp 3:10 PM). The letter requested that UC reverse its 2015 reclassification of Harold’s disability income status to service retirement and conduct an audit of Harold’s workers’ compensation, disability, and personnel records.

As of February 17, 2026 — over four years and three months later — UC has never responded.

4. The Civil Case and Karl T. Ross

On January 29, 1993, Harold and co-plaintiffs (Terrence Duren, Seth Francois, Armando Ruiz, and Richard A. Sanchez) filed civil action SC022125 in Santa Monica Superior Court against the Regents of the University of California, UCLA PD, and over twenty individually named defendants. Among the named defendants: Karl T. Ross (Acting Chief of UCLA Police Department) — the same Karl T. Ross who later stated that Harold’s personnel file was destroyed. Attorney for Plaintiffs: Saenz Clinco Fisher Diamond & Trope (Edgar Saenz’s firm), establishing a 28+ year attorney-client relationship. The case was dismissed on April 8, 1998. Post-dismissal contempt proceedings continued through November 1998.

The fact that Karl T. Ross — a named defendant in Harold’s civil rights lawsuit — is the same person who later reported Harold’s file as destroyed establishes personal knowledge of Harold and personal adverse interest in the case. This fact is relevant to the question of whether the loss of Harold’s settlement records and personnel file was coincidental or systemic.

Ross's classification of Harold as having "resigned" — purportedly because Harold obtained employment at Fox Broadcasting in March 1996 — is irreconcilable with every other UC classification of Harold's departure. Captain Chobanian, reviewing UC's own internal records in 2023 and 2026, determined Harold was "medically separated on March 1, 1996." Dr. Steven Silbart's QME report established permanent disability from an on-duty injury. Octagon Risk Services, acting as UC's own claims administrator, issued permanent disability benefit payments. UC's own IRS Forms 1099-R reported Harold's income under Distribution Code 3 (Disability) from 2003 through May 2015. The Jacobs court confirmed that DDI recipients are "not required to be separated from employment before receiving DDI" (Holding 1) — meaning that Harold's employment at Fox was legally irrelevant to his Disabled Member status under the UCRP.

If Ross classified Harold as "resigned" in UC's personnel system, that misclassification could explain why Harold received no DDI payments for approximately five years (1996–2001), was forced to seek outside employment to survive, and filed for bankruptcy — because UC's own system would not have generated disability payments for a person classified as having voluntarily resigned. The question of who entered the "resigned" classification, when it was entered, and whether it was later corrected to "medically separated" is a question UC must answer through the records demanded in this chapter.

This represents a fifth mutually exclusive classification of Harold's departure from UCLA PD — resigned, medically separated, disabled, retired pensioner, and not retired — applied by the same institution across different time periods, each producing the outcome least favorable to Harold at the moment it is applied.

VII. THE CASCADE – IF THE BENEFITS ELECTION IS VOID, EVERYTHING FALLS

If the 2015 election of benefits was coerced and therefore voidable, then Harold never validly converted from Disabled Member to Retired Member. If he never validly converted, he never validly separated from service. If he never validly separated from service, then:

1. He is still a Disabled Member under UCRP § 8.18(a), entitled to (back & ongoing) Duty Disability Income (Code 3, tax-free).

2. Every IRS Form 1099-R filed with Distribution Code 2 (June 2015–July 2020) and Distribution Code 7 (July 2020–2024) was incorrectly filed — because both codes require “separation from service” which never validly occurred. UC filed false tax documents with the IRS for ten consecutive years. (26 U.S.C. § 7206.)

3. Every dollar of insurance premium deducted from Harold’s distribution was improperly deducted — because under DDI, insurance premiums are covered differently than under Retirement Income. The March 2003 settlement included lifetime paid health insurance.

4. Every dollar of federal income tax withheld on the “fully taxable” amount was improperly withheld — because DDI is tax-free under Code 3.

5. The cessation of service credit accrual under UCRP § 8.18(e) was improper — because Harold should still be accruing service credit as a Disabled Member. UC’s own “At Your Service” calculated 21 years as of 2015; continued accrual from 2015 to 2026 would add approximately 11 additional years.

6. Harold’s transfer to Via Benefits was unauthorized — because DDI recipients are not “retirees” eligible for Via Benefits. Via Benefits’ own representative, Joshua Lewis, independently confirmed on or about January 29, 2026, that Harold is ineligible for the Via Benefits Medicare Coordinator Program due to his personal circumstances.

7. Harold’s CCW denial was based on a status (“not retired, medically separated”) that is the very status he should still be in — but that status, under LEOSA § 926C(c)(3)(B), actually qualifies him for a CCW through the disability exception. Chobanian’s classification confirms Harold’s eligibility, not his disqualification.

1. The Complete Contradiction Matrix

Every single classification serves the outcome least favorable to Harold at the moment it was applied.

2. What Should Have Happened vs. What Actually Happened

3. The Question UC Cannot Answer

UC’s answer to the question “When did Harold stop being an employee?” must be: “When he affirmatively elected to convert in 2015.”

Harold’s response: “That election was obtained by a false statement that I would lose my income if I didn’t convert — a statement that was false under your own plan at the time it was made. An election obtained through coercion and misrepresentation is not an affirmative election. I never validly converted. I never validly separated. I am still a Disabled Member under UCRP § 8.18(a), and I have been improperly classified, improperly taxed, improperly charged premiums, and improperly denied accruing service credit.”

And the IRS dimension makes it worse for UC: if Harold never validly separated, then UC filed false tax documents with the IRS for ten consecutive years by using Code 2 and Code 7 (both of which require separation from service) instead of Code 3 (disability, no separation required). That is a potential violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (fraud and false statements on tax returns/information returns).

UC cannot certify to the IRS under penalty of perjury that Harold is a separated public safety employee receiving an early pension distribution while simultaneously telling Harold and its own internal systems that he is “not retired.” The documented record establishes that every classification UC has applied to Harold since June 2015 serves the outcome least favorable to Harold at the moment it is applied. The facts and applicable law are presented here so that the reader may form their own conclusions.

Applicable Statutes and Authorities